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In the wake of the Financial Crisis of 2008 (Financial
Crisis), scarcely a week has passed without government
regulators announcing another multi-billion-dollar settlement
with one or more members of a small group of large multi-
national banks. Those banks include the Bank of America
Corp. (BofA), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan), Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (Goldman
Sachs), Morgan Stanley, Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup), UBS AG
(UBS), Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche Bank), Credit Suisse
Group AG (Credit Suisse) Barclays Plc (Barclays), HSBC Bank
USA NA (HSBC), and the Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc
(RBS).1
A horde of state, federal, and even foreign regulators
have been jointly demanding these massive payouts. Those
regulators include the Department of Justice (DOJ), Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC), Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), Federal Reserve Board (Fed), Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), Treasury Department (Treasury), Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA), National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA), Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC), Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC), and Department of Labor (DOL). State
attorneys general, from forty-nine states, plus the District of
Columbia, and even local municipal prosecutors and state
† Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law at
Miami.
1 See, e.g., Fine Times, ECONOMIST (July 4, 2014), https://www.economist.com/
blogs/graphicdetail/2014/07/daily-chart-3 [https://perma.cc/H3CP-SSB4] (setting forth a
table identifying large banks paying the largest amount of post-Financial Crisis fines).
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pension fund administrators also participated in many of these
settlements. Particularly active at the state level were attorneys
general from New York (NYAG) and the New York
Superintendent of Financial Services (NYSFS). Foreign
regulators joining in these settlements include the U.K. Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA) and regulators from Switzerland,
Netherlands, and the European Union.2
By the end of 2016, the costs associated with those
settlements for the sixteen largest banks collectively totaled
more than $320 billion.3 To put that number in perspective, it
is approximately equal to the combined annual expenditures of
the state governments of New York, New Jersey, and Illinois.4
The staggering amount of these settlements, and the broad
array of charges brought by multiple regulators for the same
conduct would seemingly suggest that the large banks are so
completely corrupt that they should be put out of business.
However, exactly the opposite occurred. As this article will
describe, these settlements were carefully structured to avoid any
interference with the banks’ business models. In addition, high-
level executives at those banks were given immunity from
prosecution as a part of the settlements.5 Only lower-level officers
2 See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the Moneychangers, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
789, 848–63 (2016) [hereinafter Regulating the Moneychangers] (describing the role of
several of those regulators).
3 Ben McLannahan, Banks’ Post-Crisis Legal Costs Hit $300bn, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON) (June 7, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/debe3f58-0bd8-11e5-a06e-00144fea
bdc0 [https://perma.cc/7NRK-CP47]; see also Gavin Finch, World’s Biggest Banks Fined
$321 Billion Since Financial Crisis, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 395 (Mar. 6, 2017); Karen
Freifeld, Arno Schuetze & Kathrin Jones, Deutsche Bank Agrees to $7.2 billion Mortgage
Settlement With U.S., REUTERS (Dec. 22, 2016 8:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
deutsche-bank-mortgages-settlement-idUSKBN14C041 [https://perma.cc/82VP-MWHV]
[hereinafter Settlement With U.S.]. That number is also much understated because
litigation and compliance costs total additional billions of dollars. In addition,
“corporate monitors” are often required to be employed by the regulators for purposes
of monitoring future compliance. BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW
PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 174–78 (2014) (describing the use of such
monitors). These functionaries add tens of millions of dollars in costs to the settling party.
Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Corporate Monitor, A Well-Paying Job But Unknown Results,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014, 6:33PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/15/in-corporate-
monitor-a-well-paying-job-but-unknown-results/ [https://perma.cc/3Y8T-BCJX].
4 Total State Expenditures, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 10 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/total-state-expenditures.aspx [https:/
/perma.cc/8ME8-87D6]. That amount of money would buy more than 10 million cars at
$30,000 each or more than 1.5 million homes valued at $200,000 each. How Much is
300 Billion? RESEARCH MANIACS, http://researchmaniacs.com/Numbers/Billions/
How-much-is-300-billion.html [https://perma.cc/NQ4N-BA8X].
5 “When the dust settled on the 2008 financial crisis, not a single top Wall Street
executive went to prison.” Ben Protess & Matt Apuzzo, Justice Department Toughened
Approach on Corporate Crime, But Will That Last? N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/business/dealbook/justice-department-corporate-crime.html
[https://perma.cc/RA5N-3D2Z].
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and traders were prosecuted criminally, but the government has
had a surprising lack of success even in those prosecutions.6
Critics have charged, not without justification, that
these payouts were really just “official larceny” on a grand
scale.7 This article will show that those settlements generated
lurid headlines but had no real consequences for bank
executives and served only to bolster the reputation of
regulators. While sparing executives, the settlements imposed
a massive and seemingly random tax on the assets of innocent
shareholders, a tax that Congress did not levy. Equally
innocent employees were laid off by the tens of thousands in
order to recover the costs of the settlements.
This article advocates an alternative to the duplicative
and ineffective regulatory system that now exists to punish
large banks. Part I traces the history of efforts to punish white-
collar crime and how that effort led to the development of the
present “too big to jail” regulatory model.8 Part II describes the
cases brought against the large banks in the wake of the
Financial Crisis of 2008 and their settlements with multiple
regulators who failed to prevent the misconduct in the first
place and who approved settlements that did little to deter
future abuses. Part III proposes an alternative to the existing
“functional” regulatory model in the form of a single regulator
6 Brandon L. Garrett, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE L.J.F. 33,
44–45 (2016) (noting that individuals who were prosecuted “were typically low-level
employees; perhaps as a result, these individual prosecutions generally resulted in
fairly low sentences for those that received any jail time.” (footnotes omitted)). As
described later in this article, several lower-level traders were acquitted, had their
convictions reversed or the government dropped charges. See infra note 69 and
accompanying text.
7 Barack’s Last Bank Bash: Former Villains are Now Victims in a Final
Round of Official Larceny, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2016, at A16, http://www.wsj.com/
articles/baracks-last-bank-bash-1482793373 [https://perma.cc/VB2P-TBVS]. As another
critic noted, large fines do not:
measure the agencies’ effectiveness at deterring misconduct. “They collect
fines from huge corporations but does that really change corporate behavior
and attitudes? The CEO signs off on the settlement, stays on board without
consequences or jumps out of the plane with his golden parachute, and its
business goes on as usual at the top with a directive to the subordinates to
find another way to make more money to pay the next fine without regard to
how that’s done!”
Antoinette Gartrell, DOJ: Top Fine Collector Among Federal Agencies, 48 SEC. REG. &
L. REP. 2218 (BNA) (Dec. 15, 2016).
8 See generally Garrett, supra note 6; Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One Top
Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html
?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/82W3-KU4Y] (describing the development of financial crime
prosecutions in recent decades and comparing them to prosecutions in the wake of the
Financial Crisis of 2008).
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that would replace the host of government agencies now
swarming over the banks. This article concludes that the
burden of fines for financial crimes should be shifted from
shareholders and employees to the actual wrongdoers,
including senior executives.
I. HOW THE TOO BIG TO JAILMODELWASDEVELOPED
This Part traces the history of so-called white-collar
prosecutions and early concerns that business executives were
being immunized from prosecution on the basis of their
economic class. Although this attitude changed over the years,
prosecutors discovered that proving criminal culpability by
executives in large companies, for activities that were carried
out by subordinate lower-level employees, was difficult. Still
later, prosecutors created “task forces” composed of multiple
regulators that proved effective in prosecuting financial crimes
by executives at small financial institutions. That model,
however, did not solve the problem of proving violations by
executives at larger banks. Those executives were often
separated by several layers of management from the actual
wrongdoers, therefore making it difficult to prove criminal
intent.9 Nevertheless, the threat of prosecution remains and
large financial institutions can lose their business licenses (e.g.,
banking and broker-dealer registrations) even where only
lower-level employees actually committed crimes. This led to
the creation of the present too big to jail model in which large
settlements make regulators look tough, while immunizing
executives from prosecution and preserving their institutions’
business licenses.
A. Class Distinctions and Crime
Professor Edwin H. Sutherland appears to have coined
the phrase “white-collar” crime in an address before the
American Sociological Society in 1939.10 Sutherland attacked
the then conventional wisdom that persons with low socio-
economic status committed a higher incidence of crimes than
wealthy businessmen. Sutherland argued that crime statistics
9 See Miriam H. Baer, Too Vast to Succeed, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1134
(2016) (describing problems in the prosecution of large public companies and stating:
“If nearly all publicly held corporations are bound to become corporate criminals in the
technical sense, our legal system ought to have a better system defining ex ante which
failures deserve condemnation and which ones do not.”).
10 Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, Address Before the
American Sociological Society (Dec. 1939), in 5 AM. SOCIO. REV. 1 (1940).
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were skewed because white-collar criminals were rarely
prosecuted.11 He asserted that “[t]he most powerful group in
medieval society secured relative immunity by ‘benefit of clergy,’
and now our most powerful groups secure relative immunity by
‘benefit of business or profession.’”12 Sutherland also noted that
crimes of the upper class were usually handled administratively
through the imposition of civil sanctions, rather than
imprisonment, as was the case for so-called lower class crimes.13
In support of his claims of white-collar immunity,
Professor Sutherland cited a number of financers who had been
prominently attacked in the press for financial abuses in the
1920s.14 Most of the individuals Sutherland identified, however,
were charged with criminal offenses, committed suicide or were
ruined financially or both, and he missed the mark. For
example, Richard Whitney, a highly visible leader of the New
York Stock Exchange, was imprisoned for several years after
he was convicted by New York prosecutors of stealing funds to
support his speculations.15 Samuel Insull, who was the head of
a vast network of utility companies based in Chicago that
collapsed in the wake of the Stock Market Crash of 1929, was
indicted, but was acquitted of federal mail and wire fraud
charges.16 Another Sutherland target, Albert Fall, Secretary of
11 Id. at 1–2.
12 Id. at 9.
13 Id. at 2 (identifying those individuals). Professor Sutherland stated that
white-collar crimes:
differ principally in the implementation the criminal laws which apply to
them. The crimes of the lower class are handled by policeman, prosecutors,
and judges, with penal sanctions in the form of fines, imprisonment, and
death. The crimes of the upper class either result in no official action at all, or
result in suits for damages in civil courts, or are handled by inspectors, and
by administrative boards or commissions, with penal sanctions in the form of
warnings, orders to cease and desist, occasionally the loss of a license, and
only in extreme cases by fines or prison sentences. Thus, the white-collar
criminals are segregated administratively from other criminals, and largely
as a consequence of this are not regarded as real criminals by themselves, the
general public, or the criminologists.
Id. at 7–8.
14 Professor Sutherland also cited the “robber barons” of the nineteenth
century as examples of wealthy businessmen committing economic crimes on a grand
scale without consequence. Id. at 2, 8. However, at the time of their depredations, there
was little regulation of business. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES VOLUME 1: FROM CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER
BARONS (1492–1900) 251–65 (2002) (describing the actions of the Robber Barons).
15 See generally MALCOLM MCKAY, IMPECCABLE CONNECTIONS: THE RISE AND
FALL OF RICHARDWHITNEY (2013) (describing Whitney’s background and crimes).
16 See generally JOHN F. WASIK, THE MERCHANT OF POWER: SAM INSULL,
THOMAS EDISON, AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN METROPOLIS (2006) (describing
the rise and fall of Insull’s empire).
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the Interior, was convicted of the bribery charges that were at
the center of the Teapot Dome scandal.17
An action brought by the DOJ against the General
Electric Company (GE) in the 1960s provides a better case
study on why prosecutions of complex white-collar abuses have
varied from ordinary, street-level crime.18 GE and several other
large electrical supply companies were charged with criminal
participation in a massive price-fixing conspiracy.19 Fifty-two
employees at those companies were also indicted, including a
GE manager with direct links to the president and the
chairman of GE.20 Ordinarily, antitrust charges were settled by
17 Teapot Dome Scandal, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
event/Teapot-Dome-Scandal [https://perma.cc/E78X-325D]. Harry F. Sinclair and Edward L.
Dohney, who were alleged to have paid the bribes, were acquitted of conspiracy and bribery
charges. However, Sinclair was jailed on contempt charges. Id. Another Sutherland
example, Charles E. Mitchell, the head of the National City Bank in the 1920s, now
Citigroup, was indicted for tax evasion but was acquitted by a jury. Nevertheless,
Mitchell was forced to pay $1 million to the IRS over those charges. JERRY W.
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900–1970) 182 (2002) [hereinafter FROM J.P. MORGAN TO
THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR]. Other Sutherland targets included Wilbur Foshay, the
head of another utility empire, but Foshay was convicted and jailed on criminal
charges. Foshay was freed after his fifteen-year sentence was commuted by President
Franklin Roosevelt and was later pardoned entirely by President Harry Truman. Britt
Aamodt, Foshay Built Utilities Empire and Minneapolis’ Tallest Building, But Lost It All,
MINNPOST (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.minnpost.com/mnopedia/2013/12/foshay-built-
utilities-empire-and-minneapolis-tallest-building-lost-it-all [https://perma.cc/5DYH-9UVD].
Other executives cited by Sutherland were ruined financially or committed suicide. For
example, the Van Sweringen brothers, who were railroad magnates from Cleveland Ohio,
were bankrupted by the Great Depression and died in poverty, not having been charged
with a crime. FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra, at 176.
Alexandre Stavisky, a French financier who created a widely publicized scandal
involving the sale of worthless bonds, either committed suicide or was murdered after his
wrongdoing was discovered. Stavisky Affair, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/event/Stavisky-Affair [https://perma.cc/66FN-4BYW]. Ivan Krueger,
the infamous Swedish businessman who controlled a vast financial empire and a
monopoly over the sale of matches, also committed suicide when his businesses
collapsed in the 1930s. See generally FRANK PORTNOY, THE MATCH KING: IVAR
KREUGER, THE FINANCIAL GENIUS BEHIND A CENTURY OF WALL STREET SCANDALS
(2009) (questioning the magnitude of Krueger’s alleged wrongdoing). Another
Sutherland target, Phillip Musica, was convicted of fraud, but was pardoned by
President William Howard Taft. Musica went on to commit other fraud, including a
massive swindle at McKesson & Robbins, a pharmaceutical company. Musica
committed suicide after his thefts from that company were discovered. FROM J.P.
MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra, at 211.
18 This conspiracy was uncovered after officials of the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) complained to the DOJ that they had received identical sealed bids
from electrical companies who were supposed to be competing for TVA contracts.
William H. Andrews, Book Review, 39 IND. L.J. 170, 170 (1963) (reviewing JOHN
HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY (1962)).
19 Id. at 173, 179.
20 Id.
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pleas of nolo contendere.21 In this case, however, U.S. Attorney
General William P. Rogers asked the district court to reject
such pleas because of the egregiousness of the conduct, which
the court did.22 Nevertheless, the indictment of the GE manager
was subsequently dropped after problems developed with the
proof of his involvement.23 GE then agreed to enter guilty and
nolo contendere pleas on the condition that the government
exonerate its board of directors and top executives. This was done
through a declaration by the DOJ that it had no proof that the
board and upper level GE executives had knowledge of, or
engaged in, the conspiracies.24 In exchange, GE agreed to pay
what was then a record penalty of $7,470,000.25
As will be seen, the outcome in the GE case is similar to
the model used in the post-Financial Crisis cases. The DOJ
made headlines by bringing the case against GE, but soon
realized that proving charges against senior managers would
be difficult. Moreover, destroying the company would have
served no useful purpose. To the contrary, GE shareholders
would have lost their investment in this very valuable and
viable enterprise, GE suppliers would have suffered grave
losses, and thousands of employees would have lost their jobs,
destroying families and whole communities in the process. In
the end, the government got its headlines, GE executives were
exonerated, and GE continued its business unhindered.
B. The SEC Settlement Model Sets the Stage for Too Big to
Jail
The federal securities laws enacted in the 1930s broadly
criminalized misconduct on Wall Street. Initially, however,
prosecutions under those statutes largely ignored the large
financial institutions and their executives. Instead, criminal
21 In such a plea, the defendant agrees to a conviction but does not admit the
charges. Nolo Contedere, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nolo_
contendere [https://perma.cc/WMW9-T8H4].
22 WILLIAM M. MCCLENAHAN & WILLIAM H. BECKER, EISENHOWER AND THE
COLDWAR ECONOMY, 175 (2011).
23 Government: The Price Fixing Case, TIME (May 5, 1961), http://content.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,872362,00.html [https://perma.cc/3TBZ-YP8T].
24 MCCLENAHAN & BECKER, supra note 22, at 176–79; Andrews, supra note
18, at 176.
25 Thomas Carvlin, G.E. Will Pay U.S. Record $7,470,000 in Price Fixing Plot, CHI.
TRIB., July 28, 1962, at 7, http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1962/07/28/page/85/article/g-e-
will-pay-u-s-record-7-470-000-in-price-fixing-plot [https://perma.cc/2BM6-5G7H]. Individual
defendants at G.E. and other companies were fined, but only seven actually went to jail and
then only for thirty days, and the sentences of the others were suspended. Electrical Price
Fixing Stirs Inquiry, CQ ALMANAC, https://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=
cqal61-879-29203-1371699 (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
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prosecutions focused on individuals who were looting public
companies. They included Eddie Gilbert, who stole almost $2
million from E.L Bruce & Co. to meet margin calls from his
speculations.26 Other such high-profile fraudsters included Serge
Rubenstein, Lowell McAfee Birrell, Alexander L. Guterma, and
Earl Belle. They collectively looted seventy-five corporations,
causing investor losses of some $100 million, but were given
prison sentences of only a few years when convicted.27
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) became
more of an activist regulator after it criminalized insider
trading in 1961.28 The SEC’s rise was accompanied by an
increasing interest in Wall Street crimes by the DOJ. Several
prominent Wall Street traders were prosecuted criminally in
the 1980s, including Ivan Boeskey, who publicly and
infamously extolled the virtues of greed.29 Drexel Burnham
Lambert (Drexel), one of the largest brokerage firms in United
States and a leader in underwriting “junk bonds” (i.e., risky,
high interest rate bonds) to finance mergers, was sanctioned by
the SEC and indicted on various criminal charges. The
26 Gilbert fled to Brazil, which had no extradition treaty with the United
States, but eventually returned to the United States and was imprisoned for two years.
FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra note 17,at 295.
27 Id. at 295. Serge Rubenstein was murdered. Michael Thomas Barry,Murder of
Serge Rubenstein—1955, CRIME MAG. (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.crimemagazine.com/
murder-serge-rubinstein-1955 [https://perma.cc/K3AR-EPA7]. Lowell McAfee Birrell fled to
Cuba and then to Brazil, but returned to the United States after Brazil agreed to an
extradition treaty with the United States. Birrell was then convicted of securities fraud and
was sentenced to two years in prison. FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, supra note 17, at 295; Lloyd Duhaime, Law’s Hall of Shame: Lowell Birrel,
DUHAIME (NOV. 24, 2009), http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/LawArticle-1118/Lowell-
Birrell.aspx [https://perma.cc/5S93-Y84A]. Alexander L. Guterma was indicted and tried to
flee the country, but was arrested, convicted and served a five-year prison term. Gene
Smith, Guterma, a Financier Who Lost an Empire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 1977), http://
www.nytimes.com/1977/04/09/archives/guterma-a-financier-who-lost-an-empire.html
[https://perma.cc/M8DC-WNKZ]. Earl Belle fled to Brazil but later returned to the United
States where he was convicted of embezzlement and served twenty-two months in prison.
Brian O’Neill, Remembering a Pro at Conning, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (July 3, 2008,
6:45AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/brian-oneill/2008/07/03/Remembering-a-
pro-at-conning/stories/200807030356 [https://perma.cc/CB57-ZA9E].
28 That crime was made up out of whole cloth through an SEC administrative
decision that was issued in connection with the settlement of a case that was not
subject to appeal. In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912, 915 (1961). Previously,
insider trading had not been viewed as violation of federal law or even common law except
in extraordinary cases. In Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933), a state high court
held there was no private right of action for insider trading on an exchange. However, in
face-to-face transactions, involving special circumstances some courts imposed liability for
failure to disclose inside knowledge. Strong v. Repide 213 U.S. 419, 430–31, 434 (1909).
Interestingly, when the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was adopted, Congress enacted
only a limited prohibition on insider trading in the form of a bar on insiders from making
short-term profits. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 16, 48 Stat. 881,
896 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.§ 78p (2012)).
29 See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (describing
those scandals).
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criminal charges related to the activities of Michael Milken, a
junk bond trader for the firm. As a result, Drexel Burnham
pleaded guilty to criminal charges and was fined $650 million.
Milken also pleaded guilty to criminal charges, was sent to
prison, and fined $600 million.30 No criminal charges were
brought against senior management at Drexel, but the charges
brought against Drexel badly crippled the firm, and it declared
bankruptcy several months later. Some 5,000 employees lost
their jobs as a result.31
A few years later, E.F. Hutton & Co., a prominent
broker-dealer on Wall Street pleaded guilty to a 2,000-count
indictment involving an elaborate check-kiting scheme.32 The
firm was fined $2 million and ordered to pay millions more in
restitution to the banks it had defrauded.33
Because of grants of immunity from prosecution that
were thought necessary to gain cooperation in breaking the case,
no individuals were charged. The U.S. Attorney General also
sought to justify the lack of indictments for senior management
by claiming that the scheme was a corporate enterprise in which
executives did not benefit directly.34 In any event, the charges
against the firm badly damaged its business.35
Despite these high-profile prosecutions, the SEC was
criticized for being lax in its enforcement efforts.36 Only rarely
were senior executives ever charged with misconduct and,
when charged, sanctions were relatively light. In a rare case
sanctioning an executive, in 1991, John Gutfreund, the chief
30 Milken was initially sentenced to ten years in prison, but that sentence
was later reduced. JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE AGE OFDERIVATIVES INTO THENEWMILLENNIUM (1970–2001) 126 (2002).
31 Kurt Eichenwald, The Collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert; Drexel Symbol




32 Check kiting is “the practice of utilizing the time it takes for a check to clear
as a form of interest-free credit, [which] is illegal.” Ugo Nardi, How Banks Use to Spot
Check Kiting, AM. BANKER (May 24, 2013 9:00AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/
opinion/how-banks-used-to-spot-check-kiting [https://perma.cc/5W3N-L4H3].
33 See generally DONNA SAMMONS CARPENTER & JOHN FELONI, THE FALL OF
THE HOUSE OF HUTTON (1989) (describing that scheme) [hereinafter FALL OF THE
HOUSE OFHUTTON].
34 Ronald J. Ostrow, E.F. Hutton Guilty in Bank Fraud: Fined $2 Million for
Scheme Similar to ‘Check Kiting,’ L.A. TIMES (May 3, 1985), http://articles.latimes.com/
1985-05-03/news/mn-11827_1_hutton-branch [https://perma.cc/X62G-MPBA].
35 See generally FALL OF THE HOUSE OF HUTTON, supra note 33 (describing
the background of the firm and its failure).
36 A best-selling book entitled Eagle on the Street was highly critical of the
SEC’s efforts to lessen regulation after the appointment by President Ronald Reagan of
John Shad, a businessman, to head that agency. DAVID. A VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE
ON THE STREET, passim (1991).
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executive officer (CEO) at Salomon Brothers, was charged by
the SEC with failing to report promptly to regulators that a
trader at the firm had massively manipulated the Treasury
bond market. In a settlement with the SEC, in which he did not
admit guilt, Gutfreund was fined $100,000 and was barred
from serving as the CEO of any broker-dealer firm. In contrast,
Paul Mozer, the employee conducting the manipulative trades,
was convicted of criminal charges. He was imprisoned for four
months and paid a $1 million civil penalty.37
C. The S&L Crisis Prosecutions
Prosecutors aggressively charged executives with
criminal misconduct in the savings and loan industry (S&Ls)
scandals that arose in the 1980s. In the process, a new
regulatory model was created in which the DOJ assembled a
task forces of prosecutors, in order to manage the cooperation
of interested government agencies and prosecute widespread
financial abuses by executives at S&Ls. That model was
successful in prosecuting a large number of S&L executives.
The next Section of the article, however, shows that the model
exposed some flaws when applied to executives at large
companies after the collapse of the Enron Corporation in 2001.
A collapse of real estate values and the failure of over
700 S&Ls led to the exposure of widespread abuses by S&L
executives.38 A Bank Fraud Working Group composed of
officials from the DOJ, Treasury, and the OCC was created in
order to coordinate the investigations of those executives.39 A
37 Keith Bradsher, Former Salomon Trader to Pay $1.1 Million Fine, N.Y.
TIMES (July 15, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/15/business/former-salomon-
trader-to-pay-1.1-million-fine.html [https://perma.cc/X2ZD-DH5C].
38 Two Financial Crises Compared: The Savings and Loan Debacle and the
Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/
04/14/business/20110414-prosecute.html [https://perma.cc/LC23-X5D6].
39 This Group was renamed as the Interagency Bank Fraud Enforcement
Working Group (BFWG) in 1984. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE: BANK AND THRIFT CRIMINAL
FRAUD (1993), https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/152972.pdf [https://perma.cc/G78V-S3GP];
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FRAUD SECTION ACTIVITIES REPORT: FISCAL YEARS 2004 AND 2005
(2006) [hereinafter ACTIVITIES REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/actrp0405.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL2P-SS7K]. That working group
was followed by others, including the Securities and Commodities FraudWorking Group:
This group, chaired by the Fraud Section, provides a forum for enforcement
groups to exchange information on developing trends, new laws and
regulations, and law enforcement issues and techniques. Membership
includes not only federal securities and commodities law enforcement and
regulatory agencies but also enforcement representatives from securities and
commodities exchange and broker/dealer organizations.
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special prosecution task force called “Texcon” was assembled to
prosecute a large number of S&L related crimes that had
occurred in the Dallas, Texas area.40 Another task force called
Thriftcon also prosecuted S&L related crimes in the Dallas
area. Thriftcon grew to include ninety-four FBI agents and 150
law enforcement personnel from DOJ and Treasury. Similar
task forces were created in twenty other large cities.41
Some 1,100 individuals were charged with “major”
crimes in their roles at failed S&Ls. Of that number, 839 were
convicted.42 Those S&L prosecutions evidenced an aggressive
stance in indicting and convicting white-collar executives
employed at those institutions. Unlike the GE case, however,
the S&Ls where the prosecuted executives worked were usually
bankrupt. Consequently, their jailing could cause no further
damage to the economy, shareholders, employees, or suppliers.
D. The Enron Era Scandals
The government’s aggressive approach toward
enforcement actions against white-collar criminals at S&Ls
ratcheted up after the spectacular failure of the Enron
Corporation (Enron) in October 2001. Enron, an energy and
commodity-trading firm, was the seventh largest company in
the United States when it declared bankruptcy. Its failure
revealed that Enron executives had been cooking its books by
wildly overstating its revenue and assets. These revelations set
off a firestorm in the press and in Congress, who called for
ACTIVITIES REPORT, supra, at 4.
40 CORPORATE CRIME: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 203–04 (Frank Pearce &
Lauren Snider, eds., 1995).
41 Id.
42 Two Financial Crises Compared, supra note 38. Among the high-profile
prosecutions from those scandals was Don Dixon, the head of Vernon Savings & Loan
in Texas. The failure of that institution cost taxpayers $1.3 billion. WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME RECONSIDERED 197 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd eds., 1992). Dixon was
given a five-year prison sentence for looting that S&L, using its funds for such things
as a beach house, jet aircraft, and a two-week culinary tour of France. JERRY W.
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS: FROM
ENRON TO REFORM 317 (2005) [hereinafter FROM ENRON TO REFORM]. Another high-
flier prosecuted by the DOJ was Charles Keating, the head of the Lincoln Savings &
Loan, in Irvine, California. Lincoln’s failure cost taxpayers $3.4 billion. Keating was
alleged to have looted over $35 million from that institution. He was imprisoned for
four and a half years before his state and federal convictions were overturned on
appeal. Keating then agreed to plead guilty to fraud charges and was sentenced to time
already served. Robert D. McFadden, Charles Keating, 90, Key Figure in ‘80s Savings
and Loan Crisis, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/
business/charles-keating-key-figure-in-the-1980s-savings-and-loan-crisis-dies-at-
90.html [https://perma.cc/38X4-KBTX].
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immediate investigation.43 Using the S&L model, a Corporate
Fraud Task Force was formed in 2002 to investigate Enron and
its executives.44 As the result of investigations of Enron related
activities by the Corporate Task Force, criminal charges were
filed against thirty-six individuals, including twenty-seven
former company executives. Eighteen of those executives either
pleaded guilty or were convicted after trial.45
Accounting fraud and other financial scandals spread to
other firms after Enron’s failure. By March of 2004, the DOJ
had indicted hundreds of executives caught up in the financial
scandals at Enron and other companies and over 500 of whom were
convicted.46 Included in the executives convicted were 214 CEOs
and presidents, 53 chief financial officers, 129 vice presidents and
23 corporate attorneys. Unfortunately, the successes of the
Corporate Fraud Task Force were marred by the hardball tactics
used by the DOJ to obtain convictions.47 This included threatening
and indicting relatives in order to force guilty pleas from
executives, pressuring companies to waive attorney client
privileges, and seeking to prevent companies from paying the
attorney fees of employees.48
In another exercise of extreme bad judgment, the DOJ
indicted Enron’s accounting firm, Arthur Andersen LLP.49 That
firm was subsequently convicted of mail and wire fraud for the
destruction of Enron records that the government thought
might be relevant to its investigation of Enron.50 The Supreme
Court reversed the firm’s conviction, rejecting the DOJ’s
prosecution theory for its mail and wire fraud charges. The
Supreme Court’s exoneration, however, came too late to save
43 FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 42, at 67, 91–94.
44 Initially, this task force was composed of the DOJ, SEC, CFTC, but was
gradually expanded to include dozens of regulators. FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra
note 42, at 109–10.
45 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: President’s Corporate Fraud Task
Force Marks Five Years of Ensuring Corporate Integrity (July 17, 2007), https://
www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/July/07_odag_507.html [https://perma.cc/7CEE-84XG].
46 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
ENRON ERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2004–2006) 33 (2011) [hereinafter FROM
ENRON ERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS]; Alexei Barrionuevo & Kurt Eichenwald,
The Enron Verdict: The Overview; Tough Justice For Executives in Enron Era, N.Y. TIMES,
May 27, 2006, at C4, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05E2D91E3EF934
A15756C0A9609C8B63&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/99PU-EJTP].
47 FROM ENRON ERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS, supra note 46, at 33.
48 FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 42, at 108–18; FROM ENRON ERA
SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS, supra note 46, at 59–62.
49 See Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 702 (2005)
(describing that indictment).
50 Id. at 707–08.
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the firm.51 Its business was destroyed and some 28,000 Arthur
Andersen employees lost their jobs.52
This was certainly a black eye for the government.
There was much criticism of the government’s overreaching in
the Arthur Andersen case. As the Economist asserted,
“prosecutors should reserve the criminal prosecution of service
firms such as accountants, banks and insurance firms, which
depend on government licenses to stay in business, to only the most
egregious cases. After all, the SEC and other agencies already have
a powerful sanction in civil lawsuits.”53 Such criticism caused the
DOJ to seek alternatives to criminal sanctions, which led to the use
of deferred prosecution agreements and large fines. Financial
service firms readily consented to that change in approach, as the
Arthur Andersen indictment sent a clear and ominous message to
financial service firms and their executives (i.e., settle with the
government or face destruction of their business).
E. Energy Price Manipulations
The collapse of Enron also resulted in an investigation
of its energy trading practices in the California electricity
market. Those investigations were conducted by, among others,
the California Attorney General, DOJ, CFTC and FERC. The
California Attorney General boasted that his office recovered
more than $3.3 billion from energy trading firms for abusive
trading practices uncovered in these investigations.54 FERC
assessed fines that totaled over $4 billion for energy trading on
bankrupt Enron as well as five other firms.55 Several Enron
traders were indicted and pleaded guilty to criminal charges
for manipulating electricity prices.56
The energy price manipulations also gave rise to an
aggressive prosecutorial stance by the CFTC. Between 2002
and 2009, the CFTC brought actions charging false reporting
and attempted manipulation against forty-two energy-trading
firms, many of whom had been the target of FERC charges.
Thirty-one individuals were also charged, but almost all of
these defendants were traders, not senior level executives. The
51 Id.
52 FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 42, at 206–12.
53 Reversed and Remanded: The Supreme Court’s Quashing of the Accounting
Firm’s Conviction Sends an Important Signal, ECONOMIST (June 2, 2005), http://
www.economist.com/node/4033351 [https://perma.cc/3SQD-JQ4C].
54 JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
MARKETMANIPULATION 271 (2014) [hereinafter LAW ENFORCEMENT].
55 Id. at 272.
56 Id. at 271.
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CFTC assessed penalties that totaled over $430 million, which
were extraordinary amounts for this small agency.57 These
penalties were set through settlements in which the respondents
neither admitted nor denied the charges.58 One CFTC case
actually went to trial and a jury found the defendant guilty of
attempted manipulation, but the court set that verdict aside
because of the inadequacy of the government’s evidence.59
The CFTC joined forces with the DOJ, and they jointly
brought an energy price manipulation action against BP
America, which the company settled for approximately $303
million.60 No executives were indicted, but the BP traders that
conducted those trades were indicted on manipulation charges.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
dismissed the case because the trading was determined not to
be subject to CFTC regulations and did not meet requirements
of the mail and wire fraud statutes under which the defendants
had been indicted.61
In another case, the DOJ indicted Reliant Energy
(Reliant) and four of its traders on Commodity Exchange Act
manipulation charges. The DOJ settled those charges after the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
decision by the lower court that would have made the charges
difficult to prove.62 Reliant and its traders then entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement pursuant to which Reliant was
fined $22 million.63 Reliant also paid $50 million to settle FERC
charges over its energy trading practices, and it paid $445
million to settle claims brought by state attorneys general.64
Reliant additionally settled SEC charges, which asserted that
its trading practices had artificially inflated revenues reported
to shareholders.65
F. Late Trading Scandals
Another Enron-era scandal further exposed the
difficulty facing a regulator of deciding between a settlement
with a large financial services firm or trying to prove criminal
57 FROMENRONERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIMECRISIS, supra note 46, at 210.
58 LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 54, at 276–77.
59 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Dizona, 594 F.3d 408 (5th
Cir. 2010).
60 LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 54, at 284.
61 United States v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 2011).
62 United States v. Reliant Energy Servs, Inc., 188 F. App’x 629, 630 (9th Cir. 2006).
63 LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 54, at 283.
64 Id. at 281–82.
65 FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 42, at 232.
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charges, even against lower-level employees. This case arose
from so-called “late trading” by hedge funds and other
professional traders in the shares of mutual funds operated by
large financial firms.66 The courts dismissed several suits
brought by the SEC over that activity, but that agency was
able to collect over $4.6 billion in civil penalties in cases that
were settled without admitting or denying the charges.67
The SEC and the New York Attorney General (NYAG)
brought late trading charges against BofA, eventually settling
for $675 million, but no executives were charged.68 The NYAC
indicted an BofA employee conducting the trades; he was
ultimately acquitted of most of the charges. The remaining
counts, on which the jury deadlocked, were later dropped. After
that defeat, the NYAG dismissed similar charges brought
against a trader for the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.
That bank had earlier paid $125 million to settle charges over
that conduct.69
G. The Financial Analysts Settlement
Still another scandal arising during the Enron era
became the prototype for the too big to jail model used after the
Financial Crisis of 2008. That case was called the “analysts
scandal” because it involved stock analysts who worked for
large Wall Street investment banks who were charged with
issuing false financial reports in order to aid the firms’
investment banking operations.70 Ten large investment banks
agreed to a collective settlement with several regulators,
including the SEC and the NYAG, which totaled $1.4 billion,
66 Late trading allowed those traders to buy mutual fund shares after their
closing price was set and after the traders were able to observe an improvement in
value after the close by following trading in correlated markets. See generally Jerry W.
Markham, Mutual Fund Scandals—A Comparative Analysis of the Role of Corporate
Governance in the Regulation of Collective Investments, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 67, 89
(2006) (describing this practice).
67 FROMENRONERASCANDALS TO THESUBPRIMECRISIS, supra note 46, at 400.
68 Josh Friedman, FleetBoston, BofA to Pay $675 Million, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/mar/16/business/fi-mutual16 [https://perma.cc/
EQN7-3LEH].
69 Reuters & Bloomberg News, Charges Against Former CIBC Exec Are
Dropped , L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/22/business/
fi-wrap22.2 [https://perma.cc/9YKG-T4UU]; see also Reuters, Former BofA Broker
Acquitted on 29 Counts, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/
jun/10/business/fi-sihpol10 [https://perma.cc/6XKL-FSQN].
70 FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 42, at 400–20.
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an amount that drew substantial interest in the press. No
executives were charged.71
The settling firms included Citigroup, Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, UBS, Deutsche Bank, and Bear Stearns,
which was later acquired by JPMorgan during the Financial
Crisis.72 Those firms, along with several other large banks,
would become the “usual suspects” for massive settlements
after the Financial Crisis. The financial analysts settlement
also became the model for settlements with regulators in the
aftermath of the Financial Crisis where large, headline-
grabbing fines would be imposed without any admission of
wrongdoing on the part of the investment banks. In exchange,
the banks would keep their franchise and senior executives
would be given immunity from prosecution.
Although this article focuses on the application of this
model of big fines to large banks and financial services, that
approach has been applied to other business sectors, such as the
GE case described above.73 This model was also used in the 1998
massive tobacco settlement, in which tobacco manufacturers
agreed to pay the states $246 billion over a twenty-five year
period.74 In another instance, BP paid $4 billion to settle criminal
charges over the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.75 In just one week at
the end of the Obama administration, automobile manufactures
and pharmaceutical companies, as well as the large banks and
others, agreed to pay a total of $20 billion to settle DOJ
charges.76 For example, Volkswagen agreed to pay
71 Two prominent analysts, Henry Blodget of Merrill Lynch and Jack Grubman of
Salomon Smith Barney, which was owned by Citigroup, were barred from the industry, but
no senior officials were charged with any crime. Associated Press, Regulators Finalize $1.4
Billion Wall St. Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2003 2:46 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/04/28/business/regulators-finalize-14-billion-wall-st-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/
RFQ8-2WKL]. Especially controversial was the involvement of Grubman with Sandy Weill,
the head of Citigroup. Weill was on the board of AT&T and was seeking AT&T’s business
for Citigroup. In order to induce Grubman to upgrade his recommendations on AT&T, Weill
had Citigroup make a $1 million donation to an elite preschool program in order to obtain
the admittance of Grubman’s children to the program. FROMENRON TOREFORM, supra note
42, at 407–08.
72 FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 42, at 416.
73 See supra notes 18–25 and accompanying text.
74 15 Years Later, Where Did All the Cigarette Money Go? NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Oct. 13, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/10/13/233449505/15-years-later-
where-did-all-the-cigarette-money-go [https://perma.cc/WS5B-FXHV].
75 Steven Mufson, BP Settles Criminal Charges for $4 Billion in Spill; Supervisors
Indicted on Manslaughter, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/bp-to-pay-billions-in-gulf-oil-spill-settlement/2012/11/15/ba0b783a-
2f2e-11e2-9f50-0308e1e75445_story.html?utm_term=.7438e5688634 [https://perma.cc/
C28F-XTY4].) (two rig supervisors indicted for manslaughter and a vice president indicted
for lying to government about the intensity of the spill).
76 Aruna Viswanatha, Obama Administration Races to Finish Probes, Wring
Payouts From Firms, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-
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approximately $4.3 billion in fines to settle DOJ charges over
its emission scandal so that it could continue in business.77
Takata, the nearly bankrupt manufacturer of faulty airbags,
reached a $1 billion dollar settlement with regulators.78
II. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SETTLEMENTS
A. The Crisis
The Financial Crisis was triggered by a bubble in the
housing market that had been spurred by low interest rates
and lax standards for mortgage lending. The Federal Reserve
Board (the Fed) burst that bubble when it raised interest rates
on seventeen consecutive occasions between 2004 and 2006.79 A
worldwide panic ensued after Lehman Brothers, a giant global
investment bank, declared bankruptcy.80 Additional large banks
that nearly failed, or were rescued, during the Financial Crisis
included: Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia Bank,
Washington Mutual, Countrywide Financial Group, and the
American International Group. Other major institutions were
threatened as well, including Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs.81 There was much concern that, if those
administration-races-to-finish-probes-wring-payouts-from-firms-1484792587 [https://
perma.cc/HY6V-D4W8].
77 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Volkswagen AG Agrees to
Plead Guilty and Pay $4.3 Billion in Criminal and Civil Penalties; Six Volkswagen
Executives and Employees are Indicted in Connection with Conspiracy to Cheat U.S.
Emissions Tests (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-ag-agrees-
plead-guilty-and-pay-43-billion-criminal-and-civil-penalties-six [https://perma.cc/A4KG-
YH9V]. DOJ indicted six executives at Volkswagen over this scandal. Protess &
Apuzzo, supra note 5. Fiat Chrysler was also being targeted. Steven Overly & Brady Dennis,
EPA: Fiat Chrysler Software Enabled Emissions Cheating, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/01/12/epa-fiat-chrysler-used-software-to-
cheat-on-emissions-tests/?utm_term=.25bc87f016f1 [https://perma.cc/LXV6-SASC].
78 Apparently, this larger fine was based on a theory that the company had to
be destroyed before it could be saved through an acquisition by another company.
Three Takata executives were also indicted as criticism mounted of DOJ failure to
indict executives. Hiroko Tabuchi & Neal E. Boudette, 3 Takata Executives Face Criminal
Charges Over Exploding Airbags, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/01/13/business/takata-airbag-criminal-charges.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3ZNB-
JFGX].
79 See Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—Some Thoughts on a
“Sustainable” and “Organic” Regulatory System, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 381, 390–91
(2009) (describing these interest rate hikes and their effects).
80 Edmund L. Andrews, In Fed Rate Cut, Fears of Long Recession, N.Y. TIMES,
(Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/business/economy/07fed.html [https://
perma.cc/NYA8-AH6Z].
81 See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION (2006-2009) 524–70 (2011)
[hereinafter FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION] (describing those
bailouts).
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institutions failed, the economy could collapse completely,
resulting in a Great Depression such as the one that occurred
in the 1930s.82
In order to avert a complete financial meltdown, the
federal government pushed through several bailout programs,
including the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).83
Although those bailouts proved to be a very lucrative
investment for the government, they sparked much populist
resentment around the country against the large banks.84
Congress responded with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank), which
imposed massive amounts of regulation on Wall Street
financial services firms.85 Fueled by the press and populist
sentiment, regulators also went on a banker-bashing spree,
where the bankers “were called public enemies. They were
strung up in effigy during protests in London and New York.
Their behavior spurred an outcry that changed the politics of
the West.”86
As the next Section shows, the initial focus of those
actions was on residential mortgage security abuses, which
were thought to be at the heart of the causes of the Financial
Crisis. Numerous regulators obtained billions of dollars in
settlements in those cases from large banks. Although those
cases charged widespread and egregious fraud by the
82 For example, the chairman of the Fed asserted that:
As a scholar of the Great Depression, I honestly believe that September and
October 2008 was the worst financial crisis in global history, including the
Great Depression. If you look at the firms that came under pressure in that
period . . . only one . . . was not at serious risk of failure . . . . So out of maybe
the [thirteen] . . . of the most important financial institutions in the United
States, [twelve] were at risk of failure within a period of a week or two.
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF
THENATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN
THE UNITED STATES 354 (2011) (omission in original) (quoting Ben Bernake, Closed
Door Session with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Nov. 17, 2009)), https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/CHM2-68EZ].
83 FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 81, at
561–65 (describing this crisis and the TARP bailout).
84 “In all, through TARP and other efforts, taxpayers injected $426.35 billion
into banks and auto companies. The sale of stock and interest payments [alone]
brought in $441.7 billion” for the government. Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Declares Bank
and Auto Bailouts Over and Profitable, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/business/us-signals-end-of-bailouts-of-automakers-and-
wall-street.html [https://perma.cc/A9MB-UYQS].
85 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 114 Stat. 1376.
86 Edward Robinson, What Happened to Banker Bashing, BLOOMBERG MKTS.,
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-24/finance-is-no-longer-
the-enemy-as-bankers-come-in-from-the-cold [https://perma.cc/D8Q3-4G7E].
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companies, no senior executives were prosecuted. The DOJ also
had only mixed success in prosecuting even lower-level
employees. Nevertheless, this model was thereafter applied to
other financial sectors including auction rate securities, tax
shelters, the setting of benchmark interest rates, foreign currency
exchange rate benchmarks, money laundering and embargo
violations, trading practices, account opening procedures and
even to recordkeeping requirements. In order to demonstrate how
this regulatory model has been abused, the next Section details
at length the prosecutions and settlements in each of those
categories. A review of those cases provides strong, indeed,
mind-numbing evidence that “the too big to fail” model was
deliberately formulated and that it intentionally immunizes
senior executives from criminal prosecution in exchange for
large settlements.
B. Mortgage Related Prosecutions Arising from the
Financial Crisis
1. The Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force
In 2008, the newly inaugurated Obama administration
created a Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force for
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS Task Force) in
the aftermath of the Financial Crisis.87 The RMBS Task Force
was comprised of representatives from “dozens of state and
federal agencies.”88 They included representatives from the
DOJ and several of its U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, FBI, SEC, HUD,
FHFA, Fed, Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board,
87 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Att’y’s Office, District of Conn., Indictment
Charges Former Cantor Fitzgerald RMBS Trader with Securities Fraud (Dec. 9, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/indictment-charges-former-cantor-fitzgerald-rmbs-trader-
securities-fraud [https://perma.cc/Q95A-HPYW].The Department of Justice described
RMBS as follows:
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) are collections of mortgages
and home equity loans, which are grouped together and sold as packages
between and among banks, money managers, pension funds and others.
Investors in RMBS receive payments on a monthly basis. Those payments are
based on the extent to which homeowners, who had originally taken out the
mortgages or loans, repaid their lenders. The payments to RMBS investors
continue until the homeowners repay their mortgage debt, refinance or
default. Unlike stocks that trade on the New York Stock Exchange or the
NASDAQ, RMBS are not publicly traded on an exchange and pricing
information is not publicly available. Instead, buyers and sellers of RMBS
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FinCEN, and state attorneys general’s offices.89 The RMBS
Task Force appeared to be an effort to reprise the Enron
Corporate Fraud Task Force.
The large number of indictments of executives that
followed the S&L crisis and the Enron era scandals were not
present in the RMBS cases. It is not completely clear why it is the
case, but it is likely that the difficulty of prosecuting executives
requires so many government resources that the game was not
thought to be worth the candle. This would be especially true if
the government were to have another debacle such as the Arthur
Andersen case that is described above.90 This difficulty was
underscored after the DOJ received a major setback in one of its
first prosecutions arising from RMBS abuses.
In that case, two Bear Stearns hedge fund managers
were charged with fraud for falsely advising investors that
their investments in funds holding RMBS were safe and for
secretly selling personal holdings before disclosure of the funds’
collapse. A jury acquitted the defendants of all charges “in
what legal experts called a setback for prosecutors hoping for
easy victories in this era of bailouts and foreclosures.”91 The
two managers settled parallel civil claims brought by the SEC
on the eve of a civil trial for a total of $1 million. The judge
hearing the case called this settlement “chump change” in light
of the $1.8 billion in losses suffered by investors in the funds
the defendants managed.92 There were only a handful of other
indictments involving RMBS fraud, and only traders were the
targets of those indictments.93
89 Id.
90 See, supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
91 Zachery Kouwe & Dan Slater, 2 Bear Stearns Fund Leaders Are Acquitted,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/business/11bear.html?
mcubz=1 [https:// perma.cc/T3YA-73P5].
92 Jessica Dye, Two Former Bear Stearns Managers Settle SEC Case, REUTERS
(Feb. 13, 2012, 12:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bearstearns-fundmanagers-id
USTRE81C1EI20120213 [https://perma.cc/4KFD-TU9G].
93 A senior trader at the RBS pleaded guilty to criminal charges relating to
his conduct in misstating prices paid for RMBS. Another trader at that bank pleaded
guilty to similar charges concerning collateralized loan obligations. Cara Salvatore, Ex-
RBS Supervisor Pleads Guilty To Securities Fraud, LAW360 (Dec. 21, 2015, 11:31 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/740628/ex-rbs-supervisor-pleads-guilty-to-securities-
fraud [https://perma.cc/9ZGG-RKW8].Three traders at Nomura Holdings Inc. were
indicted in 2015 for misstating RMBS prices and were scheduled to be tried in 2017.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S Atty’s Office, Dist. of Conn., Indictment Charges 3
Former Nomura RMBS Traders with Multiple Fraud and Conspiracy Offenses, (Sept.
8, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ct/pr/indictment-charges-3-former-nomura-rmbs-
traders-multiple-fraud-and-conspiracy-offenses [https://perma.cc/8UJ7-5MFB.] Jesse
Litvak, a mortgage-bond trader at Jefferies & Co. was convicted of fifteen counts of
fraud. Chris Dolmetsch, Ex-Jefferies Trader Gets 2 Years for Lying on Prices, Again,
BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Apr. 26, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-04-26/ex-jefferies-trader-gets-2-years-for-lying-about-bond-prices [https://perma.cc/
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Among the RMBS settlements one notable one was for
$25 billion and was agreed to by the five largest mortgage
lenders in the country, including BofA, JPMorgan and Wells
Fargo. The regulators that brought the action were DOJ, HUD
and forty-nine state attorneys general.94 Citigroup separately
paid $7 billion to settle mortgage related claims brought by
DOJ, FDIC, and the states of California, New York, Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Delaware.95 OCC and the Fed settled
mortgage related claims brought against, among others, BofA,
Citibank, JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and
Wells Fargo. The settlements in those actions totaled about $9
billion.96
The combined list of other mortgage-related settlements
is even more staggering. Citibank agreed to pay OCC $793
million to settle OCC claims over mortgage abuses.97 Absent
criminal convictions, the wide variation in amount of
settlements described below makes it difficult to assess any
differences in culpability by these major institutions.
JPMorgan paid $275 million to settle Fed charges over
N6L7-5EX4]. That verdict was overturned on appeal. He was convicted in a subsequent trial
on one of ten counts. Erik Larson & Chris Dolmetsch, Ex-Jefferies Bond Trader Convicted
on One of 10 Fraud Counts, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Jan. 27, 2017, 12:38 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-27/ex-jefferies-bond-trader-is-convicted-on-1-of-
10-fraud-counts [https://perma.cc/L99A-WTYF]. In December 2016, a managing director at
Cantor Fitzgerald was indicted for mortgage abuses and was awaiting trial as of this
writing. Nate Raymond, Ex-Cantor Fitzgerald Mortgage Bond Trader Indicted in U.S. for
Fraud, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2016, 12:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cantor-ftzgerld-
court-idUSKBN13Y261 [https://perma.cc/66SV-7VBF].
94 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Federal Government
and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage
Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses, (Feb. 9, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-
25-billion-agreement-five-largest [https://perma.cc/LNW5-FKVV]; Danielle Douglas, Big




95 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Federal and State
Partners Secure Record $7 Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup for Misleading
Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages, (July 14, 2014), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-federal-and-state-partners-secure-record-7-
billion-global-settlement [https://perma.cc/M8BZ-4NXE].
96 Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Federal Reserve Board Reaches Agreements
in Principle With Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to Provide $557 Million in Payments
and Other Mortgage Assistance to Borrowers, (Jan. 16, 2013), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130116a.htm [https://perma.cc/F8FV-W38A]; Joint
Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., OCC and Federal Reserve Reach Agreement With HSBC
to Provide $249 Million in Payments and Assistance, (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130118b.htm [https://perma.cc/4YX4-TXDX].
97 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: PENALTY
AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS FOR MORTGAGE-RELATED VIOLATIONS IN SELECTED
CASES 6 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/680960.pdf [https://perma.cc/885Z-
G8SQ] [hereinafter FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: PENALTY AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS].
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mortgage servicing and foreclosure issues.98 JPMorgan paid
another $55 million to settle DOJ charges that independent
brokers it used to acquire mortgages discriminated on racial
lines in setting the borrowers’ interest rates.99 Wells Fargo paid
$1.2 billion to settle claims brought by DOJ and HUD over
mortgage origination problems.100 Wells Fargo also agreed to
pay a minimum of $175 million to settle DOJ claims that it
discriminated on the basis of race in directing borrowers into
more expensive mortgages.101 Wells Fargo earlier paid $85
million to the Fed to resolve claims that bank employees had
improperly steered prime residential borrowers into more
expensive subprime loans. This was the largest fine ever
imposed by the Fed over consumer lending practices.102
BofA agreed to pay a further $16.65 billion in another
RMBS settlement, which was “the largest civil settlement with
a single entity in American history.”103 The settlement resolved
actions by various U.S. Attorney offices, SEC, FDIC, HUD, and
attorneys general from several states. BofA paid another $335
million to settle a suit brought by DOJ charging that
Countrywide Financial, a mortgage company BofA had rescued
during the Financial Crisis, discriminated on the basis of race
in making mortgages.104 BofA entered into several other
settlements, including $108 million to settle FTC charges over
mortgage practices.105 BofA and its CEO Ken Lewis also agreed
to pay $25 million to settle charges brought by the NYAG over
disclosures concerning losses at the bank’s Merrill Lynch unit.
The settlement barred Lewis from acting as an officer or
98 Id.
99 Renae Merle, JPMorgan Settles Federal Mortgage Discrimination Suit for $55
Million, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/
2017/01/18/justice-department-sues-jpmorgan-chase-for-mortgage-discrimination/?utm_
term=.2d64fedcdc5a [https://perma.cc/VFA6-XQ9A].
100 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: PENALTY AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS, supra
note 97, at 6.
101 Ruth Simon & Alan Zibel,Wells Fargo Settles Lending-Bias Cases, WALL ST. J.
(July 12, 2012, 2:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230437380457752
2740578702890 [https://perma.cc/J3PK-WR7S].
102 Ben Rooney, Fed Hits Wells Fargo With $85 Million Fine, CNNMONEY (July
20, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/20/news/companies/wells_fargo_fined/
[https://perma.cc/P5YS-YMP8].
103 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Bank of America to
Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic DOJ Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up to and
During the Financial Crisis, (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-
pay-1665-billion-historic-justice-department-settlement-financial-fraud-leading [https://
perma.cc/FYE6-TM39].
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director of a public company for three years. This was one of
the few Financial Crisis related bank cases that were directed
at a senior level manager, but still no criminal charges were
brought.106
Goldman Sachs agreed to pay $5.06 billion to settle
claims made by DOJ over its lending practices in the run up to
the Financial Crisis.107 Morgan Stanley paid $2.6 billion to
settle RMBS claims brought by the DOJ.108 HSBC agreed to pay
$470 million to settle mortgage related claims made by DOJ,
HUD, and forty-nine state attorneys general, plus the District
of Columbia. The CFPB, a regulator created by Dodd-Frank Act
in 2010, joined the joint regulatory actions against the large
banks by participating in this settlement.109
It was reported in the press that DOJ was demanding
$14 billion from Deutsche Bank in October 2016, as the amount
needed to settle its Financial Crisis related mortgage practices.
A leak of that demand caused a sharp drop in the value of the
bank’s stock because it raised concerns that such a large fine
would deplete the bank’s capital and threaten its viability.110
Thereafter, Deutsche Bank settled with DOJ for $7.2 billion.111
At the same time, Credit Suisse agreed to pay $5.3 billion to
settle DOJ demands over mortgage issues.112 The individual
106 In the settlement, Lewis neither admitted nor denied the charges, and
BofA paid the $10 million in the settlement for which Lewis was responsible. It was
also reported that Lewis settled because he had no further interest in working for a
public company. Andrew Dunn, Bank of America, Ken Lewis Agree to $25 Million
Settlement in Merrill Lynch Case, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2014, 5:16 PM),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/banking/article9107189.html [https://
perma.cc/UB4Q-V8AR].
107 Suzanne Barlyn, Goldman Sachs to Pay $5 Billion in U.S. Justice Dept
Mortgage Bond Pact, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2016, 11:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
goldman-sachs-mbs-settlement-idUSKCN0X81TI [https://perma.cc/EH9J-B3T7].
108 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Morgan Stanley Agrees to
Pay $2.6 Billion Penalty in Connection with Its Sale of Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/morgan-stanley-agrees-pay-26-
billion-penalty-connection-its-sale-residential-mortgage-backed [https://perma.cc/SK9R-
9RKY].
109 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department
Reaches $470 Million Joint State-Federal Settlement with HSBC to Address Mortgage Loan
Origination, Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses, (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-reaches-470-million-joint-state-federal-settlement-hsbc-address-
mortgage [https://perma.cc/3QBM-F4CN].
110 Jenny Strasburg & Aruna Viswanatha, Deutsche Bank, U.S. DOJ Continue
to Discuss Mortgage-Securities Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2016, 11:16 PM), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/deutsche-bank-u-s-doj-continue-to-discuss-mortgage-securities-
settlement-1475440468 [https://perma.cc/J23Z-8MDY].
111 Settlement With U.S., supra note 3.
112 Jenny Strasburg, Max Colchester & Devlin Barrett, Deutsche Bank, Credit
Suisse Reach Multibillion Settlements Over Toxic Securities, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/deutsche-bank-agrees-to-settlement-over-residential-mortgage-
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traders involved in these cases generally avoided criminal
prosecution. However, a Credit Suisse trader working in New
York was given thirty months of prison time for concealing the
bank’s losses in mortgage-backed securities.113
Barclays refused to settle RMBS charges and was sued
by DOJ.114 Several other large banks were still under
investigation, including RBS, Wells Fargo, UBS, and HSBC for
possible additional demands.115 RBS announced in January
2017 that it was reserving a further $3.8 billion in anticipation
of mortgage related settlements. This addition increased RBS’s
reserve account for mortgage related litigation costs to a total
of $8.4 billion.116
2. FHFA Actions
More billions were grabbed from the large banks
through settlements in cases brought by the FHFA on behalf of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both of which were public
companies taken over by the federal government during the
Financial Crisis.117 BofA agreed to pay $9.5 billion to settle
such claims.118 BofA and one of its employees were also found
guilty by a jury of misleading Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
over the quality of mortgages originated by Countrywide
Financial, which was acquired by BofA at the outset of the
Financial Crisis.119 BofA and was ordered to pay $1.27 billion as
damages. That decision was overturned on appeal because the
defendants were found only to be in breach of contract
promises, which did not amount to fraud.120
backed-securities-1482458858 [https://perma.cc/8R2H-TD7Z] [hereinafter Deutsche Bank
Agrees to $7.2 billion Mortgage Settlement].
113 William D. Cohan, How Wall Street’s Bankers Stayed Out of Jail, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/how-wall-streets-
bankers-stayed-out-of-jail/399368/ [https://perma.cc/QYX3-MD2M].
114 Deutsche Bank Agrees to $7.2 billion Mortgage Settlement, supra note 112.
115 Settlement With U.S., supra note 3.
116 Chad Bray, R.B.S. Adds $3.8 Billion to Mortgage Inquiry Provisions as
Rivals Settle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/
business/dealbook/rbs-banks-britain-us-lawsuit-mortgage.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
5SG8-9MFP].
117 See FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 81,
at 520-23 (describing that takeover).
118 John Kell, Bank of America to Pay $9.5 Billion to Resolve FHFA Claims, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303779504579463751
775159682 [https://perma.cc/RWS6-ABWK].
119 See FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 81,
at 476–80 (Describing that acquisition).
120 United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 822 F.3d
650, 652-55 (2d Cir. 2016).
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In yet another action, JPMorgan agreed to pay $5.1
billion to settle claims brought by the FHFA.121 Goldman Sachs
agreed in a settlement with FHFA to repurchase mortgage
bonds valued at $3.15 billion that it had sold to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. The bonds were said to be worth about $1.2
billion less than that repurchase price.122 Deutsche Bank
agreed to pay $1.93 billion to settle Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac related claims;123 Wells Fargo agreed to pay $1.32 billion to
FHFA;124 Morgan Stanley agreed to pay $1.25 billion;125 UBS
agreed to pay $885 million;126 Citigroup paid $968 million;127
Credit Suisse paid $885 million;128 and HSBC agreed to pay
$550 million.129 RBS agreed to pay $5.3 billion to settle FHFA
mortgage claims.130 These and other settlements obtained by
FHFA totaled over $18 billion.131
121 Devlin Barrett, Dan Fitzpatrick & Nick Timiraos, J.P. Morgan Settles With
FHFA, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2013, 8:04 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
052702303615304579157931846055864 [https://perma.cc/JKV2-VXHN].
122 Nate Raymond & Jonathan Stempel, Goldman Sachs, U.S. Agency in
Mortgage Settlement Worth $1.2 Billion, REUTERS (Aug. 22, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-goldman-fhfa-idUSKBN0GM1VN20140822 [https://
perma.cc/Z93R-VKC8].
123 Nick Timiraos, Deutsche Bank to Pay $1.93 Billion to Resolve FHFA Claims,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702
303773704579270082457979334 [https://perma.cc/AUG6-QGSY].
124 Jonathan Stempel, Wells Fargo Agrees to $541 Million Settlement, REUTERS
(Dec. 30, 2013, 9:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-wellsfargo-fanniemae-idUSBR
E9BT0F420131230 [https://perma.cc/HY6J-8UBK] [hereinafter Wells Fargo Agrees to $541
Million Settlement].
125 Justin Baer & Nick Timiraos, Morgan Stanley To Pay $1.25 Billion in
Mortgage-Backed Case, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2014, 5:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303942404579363251382914582 [https://perma.cc/5BKS-4MGF].
126 Jonathan Gould & Nate Raymond, Deutsche Bank to Pay $1.9 Billion to
Settle U.S. Mortgage Case, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2013, 8:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-deutschebank-suit-idUSBRE9BJ0OP20131220 [https://perma.cc/PQ6Y-EFVV].
127 Wells Fargo Agrees to $541 Million Settlement, supra note 124.
128 Nate Raymond & Silke Koltrowitz, Credit Suisse to Pay $885 Million in
FHFA Mortgage Fraud Case, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2014, 2:09 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-credit-suisse-idUSBREA2K1NY20140321 [https://perma.cc/7DTU-CVQC].
129 Joe Light & Justin Baer, HSBC to Pay $550 Million to Settle FHFA Suit,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 12, 2014, 6:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hsbc-to-settle-fhfas-
claims-over-mortgage-bonds-1410539966 [https://perma.cc/5FFD-K8NS] [hereinafter HSBC
to Pay $550 Million to Settle FHFA Suit].
130 Max Colchester, RBS Agrees to $5.5 Billion Settlement Over Sale of Mortgage
Securities During Crisis, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2017, 10:38 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/rbs-agrees-to-5-5-billion-settlement-over-sale-of-mortgage-securities-during-crisis-
1499864581 [https://perma.cc/28TG-9WJA].
131 HSBC to Pay $550 Million to Settle FHFA Suit, supra note 129. This
number subsequently grew to exceed $20 billion. Federal Housing Finance Agency v.
Nomura Holding America, Inc., 873 F.3d 85, 97 (2d Cir. 2017).
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3. NCUA Accusations
The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), an
independent federal agency that supervises federal credit
unions, blamed several other large investment banks for the
failure of five large wholesale credit unions. The NCUA
accused those banks of misrepresenting the risks of $50 billion
of mortgage-backed securities they sold to the credit unions.132
RBS settled NCUA mortgage claims for $1.1 billion.133 BofA
paid $165 million in a settlement with NCUA.134 UBS Group
AG agreed to pay $445 million, and Credit Suisse Group AG
paid $400 million to settle mortgage claims brought by the
NCUA. NCUA additionally sued Goldman Sachs and
JPMorgan for sales of mortgage-backed bonds to credit unions
that the NCUA claimed were “destined to perform poorly.”135
The NCUA suit against Goldman Sachs sought $491 million
and was subsequently settled136 JPMorgan settled with the
NCUA for $1.4 billion.137
4. SEC Civil Claims
The SEC also brought claims against the large banks in
connection with their mortgage activities. For example, the
SEC sued Goldman Sachs and one low-level employee for
misleading German banks on the risks of gambling in U.S.
residential mortgages. These charges made worldwide
headlines, which resulted in a drop in stock prices, including a
fall of 13 percent in Goldman’s stock price.138 Goldman settled
the charges brought against the firm by the SEC for a then
132 E. Scott Reckard, U.S. Sues Goldman Sachs in Credit Union Failures, L.A.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/10/business/la-fi-goldman-
credit-unions-20110810 [https://perma.cc/2CYQ-GG2Y].
133 Nate Raymond, RBS to pay $1.1 Billion to Resolve Some of its U.S.
Mortgage Claims, REUTERS (Sept 27, 2016, 7:25 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-royal-bank-scot-lawsuit-idUSKCN11X2O8 [https:// perma.cc/X529-SLZF].
134 REUTERS, Bank Will Pay Credit Unions $165 Million in a Settlement, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/03/business/bank-of-america-to-
pay-165-million-to-settle-with-credit-unions.html [https://perma.cc/JZ4J-TY5T].
135 Liz Rappaport & Ruth Simon, Feds Sue Bankers Over Fall in Bonds, WALL
ST. J. (June 21, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304070104576
397590007402016 [https://perma.cc/M4VZ-EEWW].
136 Bonnie Eslinger, Goldman Sachs to Settle NCUA’s $491M Securities Suit,
LAW360, (June 6, 2016, 10:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/804325/goldman-
sachs-to-settle-ncua-s-491m-securities-suit [https://perma.cc/3E9Q-WRHF].
137 NCUA, NCUA to Receive More than $1.4 Billion in JPMorgan Chase
Settlement, (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.ncua.gov/newsroom/Pages/NW20131119JPMorgan
Chase.aspx [https://perma.cc/7QBP-462T].
138 Jerry W. Markham, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.—Serious Fraud or Just
More Banker Bashing? 30 FUTURES&DERIVATIVES L. REP. 7, 8 (2010).
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record $550 million. The employee was found guilty of fraud
after a civil jury trial on the SEC charges, and he did not
appeal that decision.139 No Goldman executives were charged
with any wrongdoing.
Citigroup agreed to pay $75 million to settle SEC
charges involving that bank’s concealment of losses from
subprime mortgage holdings during the Financial Crisis.140
Citigroup also agreed to pay the SEC $285 million to settle
charges that were similar to those brought against Goldman
Sachs.141 The Citigroup employee in charge of the deal was
acquitted by a jury of the SEC’s charges, however, apparently
because of the jurors’ annoyance with the fact that no senior
Citigroup executives were charged.142 The SEC was again
embarrassed after it dropped claims against an employee of
JPMorgan Chase, who was charged with misleading investors
in a manner that resembled the charges brought against
Goldman Sachs. Nevertheless, JPMorgan paid $153.6 million
to settle charges over the offering at issue in that case.143
JPMorgan paid the SEC another $296 million to settle further
mortgage-related issues. No individuals were charged in the
latter action.144
139 See, e.g., Susanne Craig & Ben Portess, Former Trader is Found Liable in Fraud
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013, 3:36 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/
former-goldman-trader-is-found-liable-in-mortgage-deal/ [https://perma.cc/XXG2-J3BS];
Nate Raymond, Ex-Goldman Trader Tourre Won’t Appeal SEC Fraud Case Verdict, REUTERS
(May 27, 2014, 4:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-goldmansachs-sec-tourre/ex-
goldman-trader-tourre-wont-appeal-sec-fraud-case-verdict-idUSKBN0E72JG20140527
[https://perma.cc/A8M7-T8C5].
140 Randall Smith & Matthias Rieker, Citi Pays for Subprime Feint, WALL ST.
J. (July 30, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870357810
4575397302459792766 [https://perma.cc/7XBD-GNRD].
141 Jean Eaglesham & Suzanne Kapner, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to
Settle Fraud Charges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424052970204618704576640873051858568 [https://perma.cc/27A7-AMC7].
142 Jason M. Breslow, Too Big to Jail? The Top 10 Civil Cases Against the
Banks, PUB. BROAD. SERV. (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/
too-big-to-jail-the-top-10-civil-cases-against-the-banks/ [https://perma.cc/RL2D-JPUQ].
Among the senior mortgage managers at Citigroup that were not charged was an
individual who became the Secretary of the Treasury in the Obama administration.
The Wells Fargo Standard, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2016, 6:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/the-wells-fargo-standard-1474671409 [https://perma.cc/B67Y-23ZT].
143 Jonathan Stempel & Sarah N. Lynch, JPMorgan to Pay $153.6 Million in SEC
Fraud Case, REUTERS (June 21, 2011, 1:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
jpmorgan-sec-settlement-idUSTRE75K5A420110621 [https://perma.cc/V6PV-EW6H].
144 Nate Raymond, SEC Drops Lawsuit Against Executive in Financial Crisis
Case, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2012, 9:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/sec-steffelin-
idUSL1E8MH08F20121117 [https://perma.cc/762N-GQZZ].
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Morgan Stanley agreed to pay $275 million to settle
SEC claims over its mortgage-backed bond activities.145 RBS
agreed to pay the SEC $154 million to settle such charges.146
UBS agreed to pay the SEC about $50 million to settle claims
that it misled investors on the dangers of mortgage-backed
securities.147 BofA paid $150 million to settle SEC charges over
disclosures relating to its rescue of Merrill Lynch during the
Financial Crisis;148 $131 million to settle SEC charges over
Merrill Lynch’s selection of mortgages for RMBS;149 and
another $245 million to settle further SEC charges over such
disclosures.150 Wells Fargo agreed to pay $6.5 million to settle
SEC charges over failing to disclose the risks of mortgage
investments to customers.151 Barclays and two of its traders
settled SEC charges that they misled customers and charged
excessive and undisclosed markups on mortgage-backed
securities sold to customers. The bank was censured and
ordered to return $15.5 million to customers from the profits
from the transactions.152
A few non-banks were also hit with massive fines for
their activities in the mortgage market before the Financial
Crisis. In a settlement was with DOJ, nineteen states and the
District of Columbia, Standard & Poor’s, the credit-rating
agency, agreed to pay around $1.4 billion to settle claims that it
had improperly rated RMBS.153 Moody’s, another credit rating
145 Tom Huddleston, Jr., Morgan Stanley Agrees to $275 million mortgage
settlement, FORTUNE (July 24, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/07/24/morgan-stanley-
agrees-to-275-million-mortgage-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/3ML5-3V2D].
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business.com/business-news/royal-bank-of-scotland-to-pay-154-million-in-settlement-
with-sec-over-us-loans-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/EUU7-6YAL].
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over CDO, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2013, 12:42 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ubs-
sec-settlement-idUSBRE9750TS20130806 [https://perma.cc/UL82-8SV5].
148 Bank of America and the Financial Crisis, supra note 104.
149 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Merrill Lynch
with Misleading Investors in CDOs (Aug. 6, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540492377 [https://perma.cc/RXQ9-78E9].
150 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commission, Bank of America Admits
Disclosure Failures to Settle SEC Charges (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2014-172 [https://perma.cc/3GC5-SL27].
151 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Wells Fargo for
Selling Complex Investments Without Disclosing Risks (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/
News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171483776 [https://perma.cc/KG3Q-FZDU].
152 In re Barclays Capital Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-80560, 2017 WL
1548262 (May 1, 2017).
153 Aruna Viswanatha & Karen Freifeld, S&P Reaches $1.5 billion Deal with
U.S., States Over Crisis-Era Ratings, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2015, 8:28 AM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-s-p-settlement/sp-reaches-1-5-billion-deal-with-u-s-states-
over-crisis-era-ratings-idUSKBN0L71C120150203 [https://perma.cc/68RQ-Q6V2].
2018] REGULATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 545
agency, agreed to pay $864 million to settle similar claims
brought by DOJ and twenty-one state attorneys general and
the District of Columbia. 154
C. Auction Rate Securities Settlements
Another breakdown during the Financial Crisis that gave
rise to even more massive payouts involved so-called “auction rate”
securities. These are money market investments that are, in effect,
long-term bonds that pay short-term interest rates. Interest rates
on these securities were periodically reset through Dutch-style
auctions held by the issuing bank.155 The auctions for these
instruments failed during the Financial Crisis, and some $330
billion of auction rate securities were outstanding.156
This massive market failure attracted a wolf pack of
forty-nine state regulators who forced the large banks to
repurchase over $61 billion of these securities.157 For example,
UBS agreed to repurchase nearly $9 billion of auction rate
securities,158 Credit Suisse repurchased $550 million, plus a
fine of $15 million,159 and Citigroup repurchased $19.5 billion,
plus a fine of $100 million.160 In another action, Citigroup and
154 Associated Press, Moody’s to Pay $864 Million to Settle Inquiry Into
Inflated Ratings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/
business/moodys-inflated-ratings-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/6NRC-4SEG].
155 As one source notes:
Auction Rate Securities (ARS) are debt securities that are sold through a
dutch auction. A dutch auction is public offering auction structure in which
the price of the offering is set after taking in all bids and determining the
highest price at which the total offering can be sold. In a dutch auction,
investors place a bid for the amount they are willing to buy in terms of
quantity and price. In this type of auction, an ARS is sold at an interest rate
that will clear the market at the lowest yield possible. This ensures that all
bidders on an ARS receive the same yield on the debt issue. The interest rate
is reset periodically.
Auction Rate Securities (ARS), FINRA, https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/
auction-rate-securities-ars [https://perma.cc/Z5YZ-3MYJ].
156 See FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 81,
at 486–90 (describing the auction rate market and its failure).
157 Jonathan Stempel, BofA Must Face Fraud Lawsuit by Tudor Perini Over
Debt Sales, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2016, 5:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
bankofamerica-tutorperini-idUSKBN13G2IE [https://perma.cc/8EB4-8UJK].
158 Liz Rappaport & Randall Smith, UBS to Pay $19 Billion as Auction Mess
Hits Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB121820203736224137 [https://perma.cc/3BB8-YHEZ].
159 Joanna Chung, Credit Suisse Settles in ARS Case, FIN. TIMES (London)
(Sept. 16, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/05072afa-8434-11dd-bf00-000077b07658
[https://perma.cc/8WN8-V5HH].
160 Erin Marie Daly, Wachovia, Citi to Buy Back $4.7B in Calif. ARS Deal,
LAW360 (Mar. 31, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/94605/wachovia-
citi-to-buy-back-4-7b-in-calif-ars-deal [https://perma.cc/DL56-P5VX].
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Wachovia Securities, a bank unit that had been rescued by
Wells Fargo during the Financial Crisis, agreed to a payout to
California investors $4.7 billion,161 and $880 million to Michigan
investors.162 Wachovia Securities also agreed to repurchase some
$9 billion in auction rate securities in a settlement with state
regulators.163 Wachovia Securities additionally agreed in a
settlement with the SEC to repurchase more than $7 billion in
auction rate securities.164
In another settlement with state regulators, Wells
Fargo agreed to return up to $1.4 billion in funds held by
customers in auction rate securities.165 BofA agreed to
repurchase $4.7 billion of auction rate securities in a
settlement with the SEC, NYAG, and other state regulators.166
BofA additionally reached a settlement with the State of
California to repurchase $3 billion of auction rate securities
sold in that state and agreed to pay a fine of $50 million to
various state regulators.167 BofA’s Merrill Lynch unit, a product
of the 2008 crises and subsequent bank aggregation, agreed to
buy back some $10 billion in auction rate securities.168
Other large banks on the list of usual suspects also had
to pay up. Morgan Stanley agreed to repurchase $4.5 billion of
auction rate securities, plus penalties of $35 million. JPMorgan
agreed to return $3 billion to investors and pay penalties of $25
million.169 Goldman Sachs agreed to buy back $1.5 billion in
auction rate securities and pay a $22.5 million penalty.170
161 Id.
162 FROM THE SUBPRIMECRISIS TO THEGREATRECESSION, supra note 81, at 489.
163 Carey Gillam, Wachovia Settles Auction-Rate Securities Probe, REUTERS
(Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-auctionrate-wachovia-idUSN15298
36120080815 [https://perma.cc/F8VU-J4Z2].
164 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Finalizes ARS Settlement
to Provide $7 Billion in Liquidity to Wachovia Investors (Feb. 5, 2009), https://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-17.htm [https://perma.cc/Q3XR-D44P].
165 Shelly Banjo, Wells Fargo Settles Auction-Rate Case, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 19,
2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487045339045745440
93311484348 [https://perma.cc/BA4D-E5FP].
166 Marcy Gordon & Business Writer, Bank of America, RBC Settle Auction-Rate
Securities Case, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story? id=5990333&page=1
[https://perma.cc/V7KT-QSYY].
167 Tina Peng, Calif. Regulator, BofA Units Settle ARS Claims, LAW360 (June
8, 2009), http://www.law360.com/articles/105422/calif-regulator-bofa-units-settle-ars-
claims [https://perma.cc/25KH-FQWY].
168 Walter Hamilton, Citi, Merrill to Buy Back Investments, L.A. TIMES (Aug.
8, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/08/business/fi-citigroup8 [https://perma.cc/
7JJ9-NAHQ].
169 Gillam, supra note 163.
170 Eric Dash, Three Banks Settle Cases over Bonds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/22/business/22auction.html [https://perma.cc/592S-M8LE].
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Deutsche Bank agreed to buy back $1 billion of those securities
and pay a $15 million fine.171
In a rare instance of charges being brought against
higher-level employees, the NYAG charged two supervisors at
UBS with insider trading.172 Those defendants sold auction rate
securities out of their personal portfolios before the public
became aware of the auction rate problems. One of those
executives, agreed to forgo $6 million in compensation and to
pay a $500,000 fine.173 The other UBS executive agreed to pay a
fine of $2.75 million to settle such charges. Yet, these
prosecutions were not inconsistent with the “too big to jail”
treatment of executives at large banks.174 First, there was no jail
time or even criminal charges for the executives. Second, the
misconduct involved personal trading. Otherwise, only relatively
low-level traders were prosecuted in the auction rate securities
abuses. For example, one UBS broker pleaded guilty to
criminal charges and another was convicted after a jury trial.175
Two brokers at Credit Suisse were convicted or pleaded guilty
to criminal charges.176
D. Tax Shelters
Like the Enron era scandals, the mortgage
investigations spread into other areas. In one attack, DOJ
targeted foreign banks offering tax shelters to wealthy
Americans. Those investigations followed the “too big to jail”
model in that large settlements were reached without high-
level executive culpability. In 2009, UBS settled civil and
criminal charges over that bank’s tax shelter programs for
$780 million. In exchange for that payment, UBS was allowed
171 Id.
172 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y General, Attorney General
Cuomo Announces $6.5 Million Insider Trading Settlement With Ubs Top Executive
David Aufhauser, (Oct. 7, 2008), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-
announces-65-million-insider-trading-settlement-ubs-top [https://perma.cc/4TZV-SPE4].
173 Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Counsel to Pay $6.5 Million to Settle Auction-
Rate Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/
business/08ubs.html [https://perma.cc/4QV4-HF2B].
174 Chad Bray, Former UBS Executive in Settlement With Cuomo, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 19, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487033150045
75073430919601098 [https://perma.cc/25HX-AYR8].
175 Randall Smith, UBS to Pay $81 million in Auction-Rate Case, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 5, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870
4017904575409332774283668 [https://perma.cc/U5SS-FR99].
176 Tracking Financial Crisis Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/business/financial-crisis-cases.html [https://perma.cc/
P9LA-ZW3P].
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to continue its U.S. banking operations.177 A senior banker at
UBS was indicted for his role in managing the tax shelter
program. He was extradited to the United States, but, in an
embarrassment to the DOJ, a jury acquitted him of all charges
after only one hour of deliberations.178
Charges were brought by DOJ against Deutsche Bank
for its tax shelter program. That bank agreed to pay $553.6
million and admitted criminal wrongdoing in order to settle
those charges.179 Once again, in exchange for that payment, the
bank was allowed to continue its U.S. operations. Criminal
charges were also brought against several accountants at the
large accounting firm of KMPG. They were charged with aiding
tax evasion through complex tax shelter programs. A federal
judge dismissed charges against thirteen of those defendants
because of prosecutorial misconduct. Two KPMG accountants
and a lawyer were convicted of charges.180
Credit Suisse paid $2.6 billion to settle tax evasion
charges and to keep its banking license in the U.S.181 A few
employees at Credit Suisse were indicted for their roles in the
tax shelter programs. Three of those individuals pleaded guilty
to criminal charges, but two were not given jail time in light of
their cooperation.182 The third is awaiting sentencing. Five
other Credit Suisse employees who were indicted were fugitives
as of the date of this writing.183
177 David S. Hilzenrath & Zackary A. Goldfarb, UBS to Pay $780 million Over
U.S. Tax Charges, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/18/AR2009021802541.html [https://perma.cc/XE7Z-XR8N].
178 Compounding that embarrassing loss for the government was the fact
that the banker did not put on any witnesses in his defense. Andrew Grossman,
Acquittal Deals U.S. a Blow in Tax-Cheat Crackdown, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/former-ubs-executive-acquitted-on-tax-conspiracy-charge-141
5057280 [https://perma.cc/J2FR-5HSL].




181 Andrew Grossman, John Letzing & Devlin Barret, Credit Suisse Pleads
Guilty in Criminal Tax Case, WALL ST. J. (May 19, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304422704579571732769356894 [https://perma.cc/BY3C-YZ69].
182 Joel Schectman, Two Ex-Credit Suisse Bankers Avoid Jail Time in Tax-
Evasion Case, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/two-ex-credit-
suisse-bankers-avoid-jail-time-in-tax-evasion-case-1427474709 [https://perma.cc/ZXZ3-
B82N].
183 David Voreacos, Ex-Credit Suisse Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Evasion Case,
BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2016, 5:13 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-22/
ex-credit-suisse-banker-bergantino-pleads-guilty-in-tax-case [https://perma.cc/R3FF-RDV8].
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E. The Benchmark Interest Rate Cases
In another attack on the large banks, multiple
regulators charged them with manipulating the London
Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and other interest rate
benchmarks.184 The settlements in those cases totaled some $9
billion.185 This new round of fines came with the addition of
even more regulators demanding payoffs. They included the
FCA and authorities from the European Union, Switzerland
and the Netherlands. For example, UBS agreed to pay civil and
criminal fines totaling $1.5 billion to settle interest rate
manipulation claims. Those claims were brought by DOJ,
CFTC, FCA, and Swiss financial services regulators.186
A UBS subsidiary in Japan pleaded guilty to a criminal
charge in manipulating the Libor benchmark rate.187 And in the
company’s New York Office, UBS entered into a non-
prosecution agreement deferring criminal penalties, provided
that no further U.S. criminal violations occurred for the
following two years.188 A UBS trader, who had also worked at
Citigroup, was convicted of conspiracy to defraud charges in
London and was sentenced to eleven years in prison.189
184 As one source notes:
Libor has been called the world’s “most important number,” and it dominates
the interest-rate swap market and syndicated loan market, and powerfully
influences residential and commercial mortgages. The British Bankers
Association (BBA)’s website states that Libor is the primary benchmark for
short-term interest rates globally, and is used as the basis for settlement of
interest rate contracts on many of the world’s major futures and options
exchanges. At least [one estimate of] $350 trillion worth of contracts
reference Libor.
Eosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg, & Andrew Verstein, Revolution in
Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and
Empirical Analyses, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 357, 378–79 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
185 Jeffrey Vögeli & Hugo Miller, Deutsche Bank Libor Damage Goes Beyond
Record $2.5 Billion Fine, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2015, 1:50 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-04-23/deutsche-bank-libor-damage-goes-beyond-record-2-5-billion-fine
[https://perma.cc/YD4Q-UVCP].
186 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, UBS Securities
Japan Co. Ltd. to Plead Guilty to Felony Wire Fraud for Long-running Manipulation of




188 David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, UBS Admits Rigging Rates in ‘Epic’ Plot,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2012, 7:17 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873
24407504578188342618724274 [https://perma.cc/8663-QFRF].
189 Margot Patrick, Former Libor Trader Tom Hayes Gets Prison Sentence Cut to
11 Years, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2015, 11:56 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/former-trader-
tom-hayes-gets-prison-sentence-cut-to-11-years-1450708815 [https://perma.cc/L79E-6V4R].
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However, a jury acquitted six traders charged with aiding that
individual.190
In another interest rate manipulation case, Deutsche
Bank paid $2.5 billion to settle charges brought by DOJ, CFTC,
NYSFS, and FCA.191 Deutsche Bank agreed to pay an
additional $220 million to settle claims brought by forty-five
states over its Libor activities.192 European Union regulators
also fined six large financial institutions $2.32 billion for
manipulative activity relating to benchmark interest rates.
Those firms included JPMorgan, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank,
RBS, and Société Générale S.A.193 RBS agreed to pay $612
million to settle interest rate manipulation charges brought by
the CFTC, DOJ, and FCA.194 The Dutch Rabobank agreed to
pay $1.07 billion and its CEO resigned in a settlement with
U.S., British, and Dutch regulators.195 Five Rabobank traders
were charged with crimes in the United States over their Libor
activities. Another two traders went to trial and were convicted.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit vacated those verdicts because of the improper use by the
government of compelled testimony in London that violated the
defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights, proving once again the
difficulty of proving complex financial crimes even against lower-
level traders.196 Undaunted, the DOJ subsequently indicted two
190 Chad Bray, Former Barclays Traders Sentenced in Libor-Rigging Case, N.Y.
TIMES (July 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/08/business/dealbook/former-
barclays-traders-sentenced-in-libor-rigging-case.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RZM6-AZBQ]
[hereinafter Former Barclays Traders Sentenced in Libor Rigging Case].
191 Ben Protess & Jack Ewing, Deutsche Bank to Pay $2.5 Billion Fine to Settle
Rate-Rigging Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/
business/dealbook/deutsche-bank-settlement-rates.html [https://perma.cc/8P7Y-H6NV].
192 Erik Larson, Over U.S. States’ Libor Probes, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
1723 (Oct. 30, 2017).
193 Vanessa Mock & David Enrich, EU Fines Financial Institutions Over Fixing
Key Benchmarks, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2013, 7:46 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424052702304451904579237570439505400 [https://perma.cc/SJ5F-BNAW].
194 Danielle Douglas, Royal Bank of Scotland to Pay $612 Million to Resolve
Libor Case, WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/rbs-to-pay-612m-to-resolve-libor-case/2013/02/06/2c0cc42c-6fd3-11e2-aa58-243
de81040ba_story.html?utm_term=.47ad0f814b1a [https://perma.cc/NX8H-GAS2].
195 David Enrich & Jenny Strasburg, Rabobank is Fined, CEO is Out in Libor
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2013, 4:42 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014
24052702303471004579165293824297108 [https://perma.cc/9UVX-C5MJ]; Nate Raymond,
Ex-Rabobank Traders Get U.S. Prison Terms for Libor Manipulation, REUTERS (Mar. 10,
2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-rabobank-libor-idUSKCN0WC2XV [https://
perma.cc/5RZK-3B4S].
196 United States v. Allen, 864 F.3d 63, 101 (2d Cir. 2017). Another Rabobank
trader pleaded guilty and was given no jail time because of his cooperation with
investigators. Christian Berthelsen, Ex-Rabobank Trader Who Told of ‘Libor Time’
Avoids Prison, 48 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2187 (Nov. 21, 2016). Another cooperating
Rabobank trader was given time-served and another who pleaded guilty was given
three months of jail time. Y. Peter King, Ex-Rabobank Trader Dodges Jail Time for
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Société Générale traders, charging that they manipulated
Libor submissions.197
Barclays settled interest rate manipulation claims
brought by the CFTC, DOJ and FCA for $453 million and
admitted violations.198 Two Barclays traders were acquitted of
criminal charges over these activities.199 The chairman of
Barclays, Marcus Agius, and its CEO, Robert Diamond, resigned
and waived their bonuses, but did not face any criminal
charges.200 In another settlement, Barclays paid $100 million to
settle interest rate benchmark charges that were brought by
forty-three states and the District of Columbia.201
Lloyds Banking Group PLC agreed to pay $370 million
to U.S. and U.K. authorities to settle charges over its alleged
interest rate manipulations.202 Goldman Sachs, RBS, Barclays
and Citigroup agreed to pay a total of $570 million to settle
claims brought by the CFTC charging attempted manipulation
of the ISDAfix, a global interest rate benchmark.203 In one
rather unique action, the FDIC sued Barclays, RBS, Deutsche
Bank, Rabobank, UBS and others in a London court charging
manipulation of the Libor index. This was unusual because the
U.S. government regulators do not often seek relief in foreign
courts. Moreover, a U.S. court had previously dismissed claims
brought by the FDIC against those banks for lack of
Fixing Libor, LAW360 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/862353/ex-
rabobank-trader-dodges-jail-time-for-fixing-libor [https://perma.cc/2RTA-66KW].
197 Austen Hufford, Two Bankers Indicted in Libor-Manipulation Case, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/two-bankers-indicted-in-libor-
manipulation-case-1503611202 [https://perma.cc/7QXM-ZDEC].
198 Barclays was charged with attempting to manipulate those benchmark
rates by providing artificially low quotes during the Financial Crisis. Barclays engaged
in this conduct in order to aid other positions. The bank was also concealing the fact
that it was paying higher interest rates than other large banks, which would call its
financial stability into question. LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 54, at 340.
199 Former Barclays Traders Sentenced in Libor-Rigging Case, supra note 190.
200 Id.; Mark Scott & Michael J. De La Merced, Chairman of Barclays Resigns,
N. Y. TIMES (July 1, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/chairman-of-
barclays-is-expected-to-resign/ [https://perma.cc/G7XY-QRKF].
201 Jill Treanor, Barclays Bank Reaches $100m US Settlement Over Libor
Rigging Scandal, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/
2016/aug/08/barclays-libor-100m-us-settlement [https://perma.cc/U7RA-FBZD].
202 Andrew Khouri, British Bank Lloyds to Pay $370 Million to Settle Libor
Probes, L.A. TIMES (July 28, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-lloyds-libor-
20140728-story.html [https://perma.cc/G3ZJ-PSK9].
203 Matthew Leising, Rate Benchmark Scandal Hits $570 Million in Fines
as RBS Settles, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2017, 11:41 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-02-03/rbs-pays-85-million-to-settle-cftc-s-isdafix-manipulation-
case [https://perma.cc/SYQ6-Y6CJ].
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jurisdiction, which would seemingly evidence a lack of U.S.
interest in the matter.204
F. Foreign Exchange Manipulations
In yet another round of massive fines, the large banks
were charged with manipulating foreign exchange rate
benchmarks and defrauding institutional clients in foreign
exchange transactions.205 The regulatory fines arising from
those charges totaled nearly $15 billion.206 In one such action,
several large banks agreed to pay $4.3 billion to settle claims
that they manipulated foreign currency exchange rates and
misused customer order information. The settling banks were
Citigroup, JPMorgan, UBS, RBS, HSBC, and BofA.207 This
settlement was reached with the CFTC, OCC, FCA, and the
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority.208 A South
African antitrust regulator also charged that these and other
large banks had manipulated foreign currency transactions in
the rand.209 Citigroup paid $5.4 million to settle charges
brought by that regulator.210
The DOJ and the Fed reached a separate settlement
over foreign currency with UBS, Barclays, Citigroup,
JPMorgan, BofA, and RBS. That settlement collectively totaled
204 Caroline Binham & Barney Thompson, FDIC Sues Barclays, RBS and
Other Banks Over Libor, FIN. TIMES (London) (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/46d51cbe-8360-11e7-a4ce-15b2513cb3ff [https://perma.cc/6C9B-YLKL].
205 See generally Regulating the Moneychangers, supra note 2 (describing the
foreign exchange market and its regulation).
206 See Chiara Albanese, David Enrich & Katie Martin, Citigroup, J.P.
Morgan Take Brunt of Currencies Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-reach-settlement-in-foreign-exchange-rigging-probe-
1415772504 [https://perma.cc/NWV6-WR4A]; Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Rigging




207 A single trader at HSBC Holdings Plc was convicted of criminal charges for
trading in advance of customer orders. Lananh Nguyen & Patricia Hurtado, HSBC
Trader’s Conviction Will Echo Through $5 Trillion FX Market, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1727 (Oct. 30, 2017).
208 Suzi Ring, Liam Vaughan & Jesse Hamilton, Citigroup, JPMorgan Pay Most in
$4.3 Billion FX Rig Cases, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-11-12/banks-to-pay-3-3-billion-in-fx-manipulation-probe [https://perma.cc/
KDD8-8RD4].
209 Renee Bonochris &Mike Cohen, JPMorgan to HSBC Face Fines in S.African
Rand-Rigging Probe, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 15, 2017, 9:34 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
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[https://perma.cc/XSR2-6J77].
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49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 367 (Feb. 27, 2017).
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$5.6 billion.211 Except for Barclays, these same banks had been
parties to the earlier $4.3 billion settlement over currency
abuses. Barclays agreed with DOJ to plead guilty to criminal
antitrust violations in connection with currency manipulation
claims.212 It also agreed to pay a total of $2.4 billion to settle
claims brought by the CFTC, Fed, FCA, and NYSFS.213
Barclays was further found to have breached its Libor
manipulation non-prosecution agreement through its foreign
currency trading and was fined $60 million.214 That bank was
allowed to continue its business in the United States, and no
senior executives at the bank were charged with wrongdoing.
Only a small number of traders were indicted.215
Citicorp, JPMorgan, Barclays, and RBS pleaded guilty
to conspiring to manipulate the price of dollars and euros in the
foreign currency exchange market. They agreed to pay criminal
fines to the DOJ of more than $2.5 billion. UBS agreed to plead
guilty to manipulating benchmark interest rates. UBS paid an
additional $203 million criminal penalty after it was found to
have breached its earlier non-prosecution agreement settling
the benchmark interest rate claims.216
Another action involving allegedly fraudulent currency
rates quotes was brought against the Bank of New York Mellon
(BONY) by the DOJ, DOL, SEC, NYAG,217 and the Florida
Attorney General.218 BONY settled those state and federal
claims, and related class actions, for $714 million.219 Deutsche
Bank agreed to pay $157 million to settle claims by the Fed
that it engaged in manipulative foreign exchange activities and
211 Gina Chon et al., Six Banks Fined $5.6bn Over Rigging of Foreign
Exchange Markets, FIN. TIMES (May 20, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/23fa681c-
fe73-11e4-be9f-00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/3CNB-TZKH].
212 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Five Major
Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas, (May 20, 2015) [hereinafter Five Major
Banks Agree to Parent Level Guilty Pleas], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-
banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas [https://perma.cc/4WNQ-ME2U].
213 Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Rigging of Foreign Exchange Market
Makes Felons of Top Banks, supra note 206.
214 Chon et al., supra note 211.
215 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Three Former
Traders for Major Banks Indicted in Foreign Currency Exchange Antitrust Conspiracy,
(Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/three-former-traders-major-banks-indicted-
foreign-currency-exchange-antitrust-conspiracy [https://perma.cc/79XZ-W5XS].
216 Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas, supra note 212.
217 Reuters, BNY to Pay $714 Million to Settle Foreign Exchange Cases,
FORTUNE (Mar. 19, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/19/bny-mellon-settlement-
exchange/ [https://perma.cc/TV52-9HGV] [hereinafter BNY to Pay $714 Million].
218 Press Release, Fla. Office of the Att’y General, Attorney General Pam Bondi
Announces $28 Million Settlement with Bank of New York Mellon, (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/B342E613410013CA85257C16006
5FCD8 [https://perma.cc/56BN-RGKB].
219 BNY to Pay $714 Million, supra note 217.
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other improper trading practices.220 BNP Paribas agreed to pay
$246 million to settle Fed charges over manipulative activities
of its currency traders. That bank also agreed to pay another
$350 million to settle such charges that were brought by the
NYSFS.221 Credit Suisse agreed to pay $135 million to settle
NYSFS to settle charges over its foreign exchange operations.222
In another case, State Street Bank and Trust Co. agreed
to pay $382 million to settle foreign currency claims brought by
the DOJ, SEC, and Department of Labor (DOL). DOL was
becoming a surprising addition to the list of regulators
demanding payoffs from the large banks. The DOL’s basis for
its seat at the table in this settlement was a claim that the
banks deceived Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA) protected retirement account custody clients
“when providing them with indirect foreign currency
exchange . . . services.”223 And as recently as 2017, Wells Fargo
remained under investigation for overcharging clients in
currency trades.224
G. Money Laundering and Financial Embargoes
As regulatory attacks against large banks continued to
expand into other areas, money laundering and financial
embargo violations became fashionable. JPMorgan paid $2.6
billion to settle money laundering charges brought by DOJ and
OCC. That action involved the bank’s handling of accounts for
Bernie Madoff that were a part of his massive Ponzi scheme,
however, no individuals at JPMorgan were charged with
wrongdoing.225 BONY agreed to pay $210 million to settle
220 Jesse Hamilton, Deutsche Bank is First Bank Busted for Breaking Volcker
Trading Rule, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-04-20/deutsche-bank-fined-157-million-by-fed-over-chat-rooms-volcker [https://
perma.cc/5G5K-QYEC].
221 Jesse Hamilton, BNP Paribas Fined $246 Million by Fed Over Currency
Manipulation, 49 SEC. REC. & L. REP. (BNA) 1187 (July 24, 2017).
222 Greg Farrell, Credit Suisse Pays $135 Million to Settle New York FX Probe,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 13, 2017, 2:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-
13/credit-suisse-pays-135-million-to-settle-new-york-fx-probe [https://perma.cc/W8FB-QAS2].
223 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, State Street Bank
to Pay $382 Million to Settle Allegations of Fraudulent Foreign Currency Exchange
Practices, (July 26, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/state-street-bank-pay-382-million-
settle-allegations-fraudulent-foreign-currency-exchange [https://perma.cc/Y335-3Y7Y].
224 Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo, Chasing Bonuses, Overcharged Hundreds of
Clients, WALL. ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-
fargo-bankers-chasing-bonuses-overcharged-hundreds-of-clients-1511830230 [https://
perma.cc/DKU6-CQEL].
225 Patricia Hurtado, Greg Farrell & Hugh Son, JPMorgan to Pay $2.6 Billion
Over Madoff Scheme Lapses, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://
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similar claims brought by the NYAG and DOL.226 JPMorgan
paid OFAC $88.3 million to settle embargo violation charges.227
JPMorgan also agreed to pay $264 million to settle Foreign
Corrupt Practice Act charges by the SEC, Fed, and DOJ. The
bank was charged with bribing Chinese officials to gain
business by hiring their children to work at units of the bank.228
BNP Paribas SA agreed to pay almost $9 billion to settle
charges by DOJ over the bank’s dealings with countries
embargoed by the United States (i.e., Cuba, Iran and Sudan).
That bank was also subjected to a one-year bar on certain U.S.
dollar dealings. This was a rare instance in which a settling
bank’s business activities were restricted.229 HSBC paid $1.9
billion to settle charges of money laundering for drug dealers.230
Standard Chartered agreed to pay $667 million to settle money
laundering charges involving Iran that were brought by the
NYSFS, DOJ, Fed, and OFAC.231 Further evidencing these
redundancies of multiple regulatory actions, a local prosecutor
in New York City was even a participant in the settlement.232
Money laundering settlements with various regulators
additionally included the following: Ing Bank NV $619 million;
Lloyds TSB Group PLC $567 million; Credit Suisse $536
million; ABN AMRO Holding NV/RBS Group PLC $500
million; and Barclays $298 million.233 Deutsche Bank agreed to
pay $425 million to the NYSFS and $204 million to the FCA to
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-07/jpmorgan-to-pay-2-6-billion-over-madoff-
lapses [https://perma.cc/DX2D-7BZG].
226 Dan Stumpf, Bank of New York Mellon Unit to Pay $210 Million in Madoff
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 13, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001
424127887324735104578116822082757346 [https://perma.cc/VPJ8-XSU5].
227 Kevin Roose, JPMorgan to Pay $88.3 Million for Sanctions Violations, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2011, 6:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/jpmorgan-to-
pay-88-3-million-for-sanctions-violations/ [https://perma.cc/KZ4L-5BC4].
228 JPMorgan to Pay $264 Million to Resolve China Hiring Probe: SEC, DoJ,
REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2016, 11:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorgan-
settlement-idUSKBN13C1Z8 [https://perma.cc/DJW5-WE3E].
229 Devlin Barrett, Christopher M. Matthews & Andrew R. Johnson, BNP
Paribas Draws Record Fine for ‘Tour de Fraud’: BNP Admits to Filing False
Business Records and Conspiracy, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2014, 9:17 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/bnp-agrees-to-pay-over-8-8-billion-to-settle-sanctions-
probe-1404160117 [https://perma.cc/G2NE-RRYU].
230 Aruna Viswanatha & Brett Wolf, HSBC to Pay $1.9 Billion U.S. Fine in
Money-Laundering Case, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:45 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-hsbc-probe-idUSBRE8BA05M20121211 [https://perma.cc/TK5K-SN7H].
231 David Benoit, Standard Chartered’s Fine Tally Runs to $667 Million, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/12/10/standard-
chartereds-fine-tally-runs-to-667-million/ [https://perma.cc/SR53-M2MC].
232 Id.
233 Isabella Steger, Tallying Up U.S. Regulators’ Money Laundering Fines,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2012, 3:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/08/15/tallying-up-
u-s-regulators-money-laundering-fines/ [https://perma.cc/6YP8-VPLK].
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settle money laundering charges over $10 billion from equity
trades that were transferred to Russia.234 Société Générale
agreed to pay $1.1 billion to settle claims brought by Libya that
the bank had paid bribes to obtain business from the Libyan
Investment Authority. A similar suit brought against Goldman
Sachs was dismissed by a court in London.235
The NYSFS imposed a $567 million fine on the Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ for handling funds from countries that
were embargoed by the U.S. government. That bank originally
agreed to a fine of $250 million. That penalty was increased by
$315 million after the NYSFS concluded that the bank had
acted in bad faith. The NYSFS charged that the bank had
submitted a consultant’s report to the NYSFS that understated
the seriousness of the conduct. A few individual employees
were also forced to resign and were banned from working for
banks in New York.236 No financial scandal would be complete
without a BofA settlement. However, it had to pay only a
comparatively paltry $16.5 million to settle OFAC charges that
it was laundering money for drug dealers.237
H. Trading and Recordkeeping Practices
The “too big to jail” regulatory model expanded into still
other sectors of finance in the wake of the Financial Crisis of
2008. One fruitful area for regulatory attacks against the large
banks involved their trading practices. For example, JPMorgan
experienced a $6.2 billion loss in May 10, 2012, from trading by
an employee in London. That employee was dubbed the
“Whale” because of the size of his trades. The Whale escaped
criminal charges because of his purported cooperation with the
government’s investigation. Although JPMorgan suffered the
trading loss, it agreed to pay $920 million and admitted to
wrongdoing in order to settle SEC, OCC, Fed, and FCA charges
234 Jenny Strasburg, Deutsche Bank to Pay Nearly $630 Million to Settle
Probes Into Russian Trades, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2017) https://www.wsj.com/articles/
deutsche-bank-to-pay-nearly-630-million-to-settle-probes-into-russian-trades-14858504
71 [https://perma.cc/WV8U-2TDE].
235 Noemie Bisserbe, Société Générale Settles With Libya, WALL ST. J.
(May 5, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/05/05/soci-t-g-n-rale-
settles-with-libya-wsj.html [https://perma.cc/U45S-WLYZ].
236 Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., NYDFS Announces Bank of Tokyo
Mitsubishi UFJ to Pay Additional $325 Million Penalty for Misleading Regulators,
Individual Bank Employees Will Resign and Accept Bans, (Nov. 18, 2014),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1411181.htm [https://perma.cc/HJ4C-KAP7].
237 Evan Weinberger, BofA To Pay $16.5M To Settle Alleged Sanctions
Violations, LAW360 (July 24, 2014, 11:59 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/560675/
bofa-to-pay-16-5m-to-settle-alleged-sanctions-violations [https://perma.cc/T2GL-4U4M].
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over this fiasco.238 JPMorgan also admitted to engaging in
reckless manipulative activity and paid a $100 million fine to the
CFTC.239 Two of the Whale’s supervisors were indicted in the
United States. Those individuals were indicted on the basis of
claims made by the Whale, but the indictments were dropped
after prosecutors began to doubt the Whale’s credibility.240
JPMorgan agreed to pay out $389 million to settle
charges brought by the CFPB and OCC over improper billing
practices.241 BofA agreed to pay $772 million to settle claims
brought by CFPB over its credit card practices.242 Citibank
agreed to pay $700 million in a settlement with CFPB over
such practices.243 HSBC paid $35 million to settle similar OCC
charges.244 JP Morgan and Assurant Inc. agreed to pay $300
million to settle claims that they over-charged borrowers for
homeowners’ insurance.
Wells Fargo paid $185 million to settle charges that its
employees had created some two million accounts without
customer authorization in order to meet cross-selling goals.
Those claims were brought by the CFPB, OCC, and the City
and County of Los Angeles.245 An internal OCC investigation
238 Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan Pays $920 Million to Settle London Whale
Probes, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2013-09-19/jpmorgan-chase-agrees-to-pay-920-million-for-london-whale-loss
[https://perma.cc/2BEM-GHBS].
239 Aruna Viswanatha, JPMorgan to Pay $100 Million in Latest ‘London
Whale’ Fine, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:17 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
jpmorgan-cftc-idUSBRE99F0JW20131016 [https://perma.cc/C3H9-7VQ4].
240 Rebecca Davis O’Brien, U.S. Drops Case Against ‘London Whale’ Traders,
WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2017, 7:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-drops-case-against-
london-whale-traders-1500679130 [https://perma.cc/2TXZ-S53Z]. The SEC also dropped its
civil charges brought against those individuals. Rebecca Davis O’Brien, SEC to Drop Civil
Charges Against Two Ex-J.P. Morgan ‘London Whale’ Traders, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2017,
4:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-to-drop-civil-charges-against-two-ex-j-p-morgan-
london-whale-traders-1503087593 [https://perma.cc/PFW6-3ZV4].
241 Carter Dougherty and Jesse Hamilton, JPMorgan to Pay $389 Million
Over Regulators’ Card Add-On Claims, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2013, 1:37 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-19/jpmorgan-to-pay-389-million-
over-regulators-card-add-on-claims [https://perma.cc/VC7D-XKLX].
242 Alan Zibel, Bank of America to Pay $772 Million Over Credit-Card
Practices, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2014, 4:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
052702303873604579491462886530876 [https://perma.cc/YGF5-DWWM].
243 CFPB Orders Citibank to Pay $700 Million in Consumer Relief for Illegal
Credit Card Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 21, 2015), http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-citibank-to-pay-700-million-
in-consumer-relief-for-illegal-credit-card-practices/ [https://perma.cc/4XBM-KJDK].
244 Jeff Bater, OCC Fines HSBC Bank $35 Million over Credit Card Add-Ons,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.bna.com/occ-fines-hsbc-n57982069866/ [https://
perma.cc/W9A5-SLU3].
245 Deon Roberts & Rick Rothacker, Wells Fargo Is Fined $185M for ‘Widespread
Illegal Practices’ in Account Openings, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 8, 2016, 3:58 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article100670802.html [https://
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found that the OCC missed numerous red flags and ignored
whistleblower claims concerning Wells Fargo sales practices
over a period of six years.246 Incredibly, DOL was also
investigating whether Wells Fargo had breached overtime
restrictions by having employees work long hours to meet sales
goals.247 The Wells Fargo CEO forfeited approximately $41
million in compensation. Another Wells Fargo executive was
required to forfeit $19 million in options awards.248 No
executives were indicted.249
Goldman Sachs paid $10 million to settle claims by the
State of Massachusetts that it had illegally passed information
from Goldman analysts to favored customers, information not
shared with other customers.250 Citigroup agreed to pay $30
million to Massachusetts in order to settle a claim that one of
its analysts leaked negative information about Apple stock to
four investment firms. Only one year before that settlement,
Citigroup had paid a mere $2 million to settle state regulator
claims for the improper disclosure of research on Facebook’s
initial public offering.251
Any doubts whether a giant holdup of the large banks
was underway was put to rest by additional post-Financial
246 Kate Berry, OCC Missed Several Chances to Spot, Fix Wells Fargo Sham
Accounts, AM. BANKER (Apr. 19, 2017, 4:40 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/
news/occ-repeatedly-missed-chances-to-spot-fix-wells-fargo-sham-accounts [https://
perma.cc/7ZXJ-54RQ].
247 Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Investigation Hampered by Outside Attorney
Citing a Trump Tie, Labor Department Claims, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2017, 6:19 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-investigation-hampered-by-outside-attorney-
citing-a-trump-tie-labor-department-claims-1483646713 [https://perma.cc/397W-ET2P].
248 Wells Fargo CEO Forfeits $41 Million in Stock Awards Amid Sales
Scandal, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 27, 2016, 7:25 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/ct-wells-fargo-scandal-20160927-story.html [https://perma.cc/N2X6-Z9GB]; see
also Reuters, Wells Fargo Claws Back Millions From Former Executives Over Accounts
Scandal, FORTUNE (Apr. 10, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/04/10/wells-fargo-clawback-
stumpf-tolstedt/ [https://perma.cc/ZN6D-7D3H]. Wells Fargo also settled a class action
lawsuit over this conduct for $142 million. Kartikay Mehrotra, Wells Fargo $142
Million Fake-Account Accord Satisfies Judge, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 831 (May
22, 2017).
249 The OCC was also investigating Wells Fargo for improper activities
connected with forcing consumers seeking automobile loans to buy unneeded insurance
for their cars and improper fees in connection with residential mortgage applications.
Gretchen Morgenson & Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo is Dubbed a Repeat Offender and
Faces New Wrath from Its Regulator, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2017, 11:07 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-is-dubbed-a-repeat-offender-and-faces-new-wrath-
from-its-regulator-1511951402 [https://perma.cc/LLJ5-YHRD].
250 Liz Moyer, Goldman Fined $10 Million By Massachusetts Over Research
‘Huddles’, INVESTORSHUB (June 9, 2011, 11:12 AM), http://www.advfn.com/nyse/Stock
News.asp?stocknews=GS&article=48010767 [https://perma.cc/M2TP-FEY7].
251 Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Citigroup Fined $30 Million After Analyst Sent Report to
SAC, Others, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-citigroup-
massachusetts-idUSBRE9920I820131003 [https://perma.cc/UJL2-NADA].
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Crisis cases zealously brought by the CFTC against the large
banks. For example, that agency penalized JPMorgan some
$120 million in eight separate actions that charged such things as
failing to disclose conflicts of interest, failing to supervise
processing of trading fees, failing to segregate customer funds,
exceeding speculative limits, and making recordkeeping errors.252
Morgan Stanley paid a total of over $20 million to the CFTC to
settle six separate actions for such things as recordkeeping errors,
exceeding position limits, and non-competitive trades.253
252 Richard Hill, J.P. Morgan to Pay $900K for Alleged Supervisory Failures,
49 SEC. REG. & L. REP (BNA) 126 (Jan. 16, 2017); see also Press Release, U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders JPMorgan Ventures Energy Corp.
and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. to Pay a $225,000 Penalty for Inaccurate Large
Trader Reports for Physical Commodity Swaps Positions (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7347-16 [https://perma.cc/GZS6-988X];
Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. to Pay $100 Million for Failure to Disclose Conflicts of Interest (Dec.
18, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7297-15 [https://perma.cc/
LE74-38JT]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders
Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC to Pay a $300,000 Civil Monetary Penalty for Violations of
Customer Protection Rule for Cleared Swaps and Related Supervision Failures (Aug. 6,
2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7209-15 [https://perma.cc/2LKK-
G7NQ]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Charges J.P.
Morgan Securities LLC with Repeatedly Submitting Inaccurate Large Trader Reports
and Imposes a $650,000 Civil Monetary Penalty (July 29, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6968-14 [https://perma.cc/H3L5-YGSY]; Press Release,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.
to Pay $600,000 Civil Monetary Penalty for Violating Cotton Futures Speculative
Position Limits (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6369-
12 [https://perma.cc/3C39-3EXN]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, CFTC Orders JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. to Pay a $20 Million Civil
Monetary Penalty to Settle CFTC Charges of Unlawfully Handling Customer
Segregated Funds (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6225-
12 [https://perma.cc/T92Q-SKLY]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC Agrees to Pay $140,000 Penalty for Confirming
the Execution of a Prearranged Trade on the CBOT (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6198-12 [https://perma.cc/D6KT-QJPP]; Press Release,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Sanctions J.P. Morgan Futures, Inc.
$300,000 for Failing to Properly Segregate Customer Funds and Failing to Timely
Report the Under-segregation to the CFTC (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5713-09 [https://perma.cc/UM7P-83Q8].
253 Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Fines
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney for Supervision and Records Failures Relating to Its
“Know Its Customer” Procedures (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/
PressReleases/pr6998-14 [https://perma.cc/V22Z-EKC2]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC to Pay
$490,000 to Settle Charges Relating to Rules and Regulations Pertaining to
Segregated and Secured Amount Funds (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6894-14 [https://perma.cc/L5Z4-EFLM]; Press Release,
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Morgan Stanley Capital
Group Inc. to Pay $200,000 Penalty for Violating Soybean Meal Futures Speculative
Position Limits (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6889-
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Comm’n, CFTC Orders Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC to Pay $200,000 for
Supervision Violations (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/
pr6395-12 [https://perma.cc/Q7G9-E6J8];
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Goldman Sachs paid $8.5 million to settle two CFTC
cases charging employee supervision failures.254 In another
settlement, Goldman Sachs paid the CFTC $1.5 million for
failing to supervise a rogue trader who put $8.3 billion in “e-
mini” futures without authorization.255 Citigroup paid $550,000
to settle CFTC charges over recordkeeping violations.256
Citigroup paid $25 million to settle CFTC charges that its
traders had engaged in the prohibited trading practice of
“spoofing.”257 In another case, the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi
agreed to pay only $600,000 to settle CFTC spoofing charges.258
Barclays paid the CFTC $1.8 million to settle three
cases charging recordkeeping errors and supervision failures.259
Deutsche Bank paid $5.5 million to settle two cases involving
Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Morgan
Stanley & Co. LLC to Pay $5 Million Civil Monetary Penalty for Unlawful
Noncompetitive Trades (June 5, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/
pr6270-12 [https://perma.cc/X68W-X3G4]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. to Pay a $14 Million Civil
Penalty to Settle CFTC Charges that the Company Concealed a Large Block Crude Oil
Trade (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5816-10 [https://
perma.cc/FJF8-H9KL].
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Orders Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P., a Registered Futures Commission
Merchant, to Pay $7 Million for Supervision Failures in Handling Accounts it
Carried (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6206-12
[https://perma.cc/QAC2-RNW4].
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256 Citigroup to Pay a Fine for Swap Data Reporting Violations-U.S. CFTC,
REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2017, 5:54 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-citigroup-cftc/
citigroup-to-pay-a-fine-for-swap-data-reporting-violations-u-s-cftc-idUKKCN1C02FP
[https://perma.cc/4QFR-TA8F].
257 Spoofing is the entry of an order to purchase or sell a futures contract with the
intent to cancel the order before it can be executed. Philip Stafford, Citigroup Pays $25 M to
Settle US ‘Spoofing’ Charges, FIN. TIMES (London) (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/
content/aa943ab4-de60-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce [https://perma.cc/L82V-L9CF].
258 Alexander Osipovich, Japanese Bank Fined $600,000 for ‘Spoofing’ U.S.
Futures Markets, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
japanese-bank-fined-600-000-for-spoofing-u-s-futures-markets-1502138523 [https://
perma.cc/Q6HP-RJ9D].
259 Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders
United Kingdom-Based Barclays Bank PLC to Pay $500,000 for Recordkeeping
Violations (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7452-16
[https://perma.cc/JZK3-UVMN]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, CFTC Orders Barclays Capital, Inc. to Pay $800,000 for Supervision Failures
(Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7419-16 [https://
perma.cc/3YRZ-JLN7]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n,
CFTC Orders London-Based Barclays Bank PLC to Pay a $560,000 Penalty for Inaccurate
Large Trader Reports for Physical Commodity Swaps Positions (July 6, 2016),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7401-16 [https://perma.cc/7J9E-K5ST].
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reporting errors and treatment of customer funds.260 BofA’s
Merrill Lynch unit paid a total of some $1.5 million to settle
CFTC claims that it misstated exchange fees and violated
speculative trading limits.261 In another settlement with the
CFTC, Merrill Lynch was fined $5 million for recordkeeping
violations.262 UBS paid a comparatively paltry $180,000 to settle
two CFTC cases variously charging speculative trading limit
violations and reporting failures.263
In one remarkable case, the CFTC required restitution
of $1 billion in a settlement with MF Global Inc., a giant
futures commission merchant that had misused customer
funds before declaring bankruptcy.264 The CEO of the firm
settled charges of failure to supervise the activities that led to
those violations for $5 million and agreed not to accept any
further supervisory positions in firms regulated by the CFTC.265
Since the former CEO was seventy years old and personally
wealthy from his days as head of Goldman Sachs, this did not
seem to be much of an imposition.266
260 Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. to Pay $3 Million to Settle Charges of Improper Investment
of Customer Segregated Funds, Reporting and Recordkeeping Violations, and Supervision
Failures (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7089-14 [https://
perma.cc/7ZQB-UKYG]; Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC
Orders Deutsche Bank AG to Pay a $2.5 Million Civil Monetary Penalty for Swaps
Reporting Violations and Related Supervision Failures (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7255-15 [https://perma.cc/A98T-58SP].
261 In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., CFTC No. 14-22, 2014
WL 4259211, at *2, *5, *6 (Aug. 26, 2014); Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc. to Pay $350,000 Civil
Penalty for Violating Cotton Futures Speculative Position Limits (Dec. 7, 2011), http://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6154-11 [https://perma.cc/JW2K-W2A5].
262 Pete Schroeder, Bank of America broker-dealer unit pay $5 mln penalty to
settle trading probes, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-
us-usa-cftc-merrill/bank-of-america-broker-dealer-unit-pay-5-mln-penalty-to-settle-
trading-probes-idUSKCN1BX2D0 [https://perma.cc/H588-H4GX].
263 Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, The CFTC
Sanctions Swiss Firm $130,000 for Exceeding Position Limits (Feb. 24, 2010), http://
www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5783-10 [https://perma.cc/RPQ4-AUHD]; Press
Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Sanctions Four Commodity
Pool Operators for Failing to File Timely Reports with the National Futures
Association (Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5596-09
[https://perma.cc/TM9H-R7VQ].
264 Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Charges
MF Global Inc., MF Global Holdings Ltd., Former CEO Jon S. Corzine, and Former
Employee Edith O’Brien for MF Global’s Unlawful Misuse of Nearly One Billion Dollars
of Customer Funds and Related Violations (June 27, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6626-13 [https://perma.cc/7JSJ-H7L4]. (Ed. Note: The author
was an expert witness in this matter).
265 Jon Corzine to Pay USD5m for MF Global’s Unlawful Use of Customer Funds,
HEDGEWEEK, https://www.hedgeweek.com/2017/01/06/247305/jon-corzine-pay-usd5m-mf-
global%E2%80%99s-unlawful-use-customer-funds [https://perma.cc/Q6X7-6XYN].
266 Ben Protess, In Tumult of Trump, Jon Corzine Seeks a Wall Street Comeback,
N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/business/dealbook/jon-
562 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:2
The SEC also brought a continuous stream of cases
against the large banks in the wake of the Financial Crisis. For
example, JPMorgan agreed to pay $267 million to settle SEC
charges, as well as $40 million to the CFTC, over failure to
disclose conflicts of interest in mutual fund sales.267 JPMorgan
agreed to pay $228 million and UBS agreed to pay $160 million
to settle SEC cases over bid rigging in municipal bond
offerings.268 Wells Fargo paid $148 million to DOJ and the SEC
to settle charges over such bid rigging.269 BofA paid $137
million to settle similar charges by state and federal
prosecutors.270 BofA also paid $415 million to settle SEC claims
that its Merrill Lynch unit misused customer cash and
securities to generate profits. That bank paid a further $10
million to settle SEC charges that traders in the bank’s Merrill
Lynch unit were allowed to access orders being received from
institutional investors. This allowed the traders to piggy-back
those orders.271 The bank executive charged by the SEC as
being responsible for these alleged violations was not fined or
suspended by the SEC in its settlement with the individual.
Rather, that respondent was subjected only to a cease and
desist order from future violations.272 Merrill Lynch agreed to
corzine-wall-street-comeback.html [https://perma.cc/UC5U-6ZFB]; Jonathan Stempel,
Corzine in $5 Million Settlement With US CFTC Over MF Global Collapse, REUTERS
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mfglobal-corzine/corzine-in-5-million-
settlement-with-us-cftc-over-mf-global-collapse-idUSKBN14P251 [https://perma.cc/SX8P-
WLF3]. An assistant treasurer at MF Global was also charged by the CFTC with aiding
and abetting the firm’s violations of CFTC rules governing the treatment of customer
funds. She agreed to pay a $500,000 civil penalty and to accept an eighteen-month bar
from employment at a CFTC regulated firm. Stempel, supra.
267 Owen Davis, JPMorgan Settles for $307Million Over Failure to Disclose Conflicts
of Interest, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/jpmorgan-settles-307-
million-over-failure-disclose-conflicts-interest-2232499 [https://perma.cc/S2AX-V28L].
268 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges J. P. Morgan
Securities with Fraudulent Bidding Practices Involving Investment of Municipal Bond
Proceeds (July 7, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-143.htm [https://
perma.cc/Y64F-WBAA]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges UBS
with Fraudulent Bidding Practices Involving Investment of Municipal Bond Proceeds
(May 4, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-105.htm [https://perma.cc/
9NU9-GYVT].
269 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Wachovia With
Fraudulent Bid Rigging in Municipal Bond Proceeds (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2011/2011-257.htm [https://perma.cc/NRA4-CLPE].
270 Ben Protess, Bank of America Pays $137 Million to Settle Bid Rigging
Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2010), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/07/bofa-pays-
137-million-to-settle-bid-rigging-charges/ [https://perma.cc/85ZG-YEA7].
271 Jenny Strasburg & Aruna Viswanatha, Bank of America to Pay $415 Million to
Settle SEC Probe, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/merrill-lynch-to-
pay-415-million-to-settle-sec-accounts-probe-1466693817 [https://perma.cc/4S6R-E37C].
272 Jesse Westbrook, BofA Executive Spared Any Fine After Bank’s $415
Million Penalty, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1457 (Sept. 18, 2017).
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pay the SEC $13 million to settle claims that it failed to file
reports of suspicious activities in customer accounts.273
Citigroup paid $180 million to settle SEC claims for
misleading investors about the safety of two hedge funds it was
operating before the Financial Crisis.274 Citigroup paid an
additional $5 million to settle SEC charges over failing to
protect the confidentiality of customer trading.275 In another
settlement, Citigroup agreed to pay $18.3 million to settle SEC
claims involving systems errors that resulted in overbilling
investment advisory clients. Citigroup also agreed in a settlement
with the NYAG to repay those clients $22.5 million. Morgan
Stanley agreed to pay $13 million to settle SEC charges over
similar conduct.276 Citigroup and Morgan Stanley each agreed to
pay about $3 million to settle SEC charges over claims that they
misled investors on the risks of trading a foreign currency
product.277 Morgan Stanley agreed to pay $8 million to settle SEC
claims that it misled investors over investments recommended to
advisory customers. In a rare instance, Morgan Stanley admitted
to wrongdoing in that case, possibly because this was the second
such case against the firm.278
Deutsche Bank paid the SEC $55 million over claims
that it misrepresented its financial results during the Financial
Crisis.279 Deutsche Bank also agreed to pay more than $40
million to settle claims by the SEC and NYAG that it misled
273 In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
82382, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 4831, 2017 WL 6554178 (Dec. 21, 2017).
274 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Citigroup Affiliates to Pay $180
Million to Settle Hedge Fund Fraud Charges (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2015-168.html [https://perma.cc/933N-JCDF].
275 Michael Calia, Citigroup Unit Pays Record Fine Over Alternative Trading
System, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-unit-settles-
charges-over-subscriber-confidential-data-1406302178 [https://perma.cc/338K-66DG].
276 Gregory Mott, SEC Fines Citigroup on Claims 60,000 Clients Were Overbilled,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/sec-fines-
citigroup-on-claims-60-000-clients-were-overbilled [https://perma.cc/82V5-PLD7].
277 SEC Fines Citigroup, Morgan Stanley Over Forex Trading Program,
REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-citigroup-morganstanley-
sec-idUSKBN1582HM [https://perma.cc/Y34U-HJXK].
278 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Morgan Stanley Settles Charges
Related to ETF Investments (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/
2017-46.html [https://perma.cc/7RL8-DMTL]; Morgan Stanley to Pay $8 Million to
Settle SEC Charges, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
morgan-stanley-usa-sec/morgan-stanley-to-pay-8-million-to-settle-sec-charges-idUSKB
N15T29Z [https://perma.cc/QG4X-RWUJ].
279 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Deutsche Bank
With Misstating Financial Reports During Financial Crisis (May 26, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-99.html [https://perma.cc/64TF-58MX].
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investors on the routing of their orders to dark pools.280
Goldman Sachs paid $12 million to settle SEC claims that one
of its employees improperly worked on a gubernatorial
campaign in Massachusetts.281
FERC was also back after the Financial Crisis, demanding
additional hundreds of millions of dollars in payments from the
large banks over charges of energy manipulations. JPMorgan
agreed to pay FERC $410 million for alleged manipulation of
power markets in California and the Midwest from 2010 to
2012.282 FERC ordered Barclays to pay a $453 million fine for
manipulating Western electricity prices during the period from
November 2006 to December 2008.283
III. REFORM ISNEEDED
There is no question that the too big to jail regulatory
model is now a centerpiece of financial regulation. The same
large banks are being attacked by multiple regulators for the
same conduct across a broad array of financial services in a
never-ending stream of cases. For the most part, as this article
has described in detail in Parts I and II, the only penalties in
these actions have been large monetary settlements with the
banks and criminal prosecution of only lower-level employees.
These settlements make eye-popping headlines but punish no
one except innocent shareholders, who must bear those costs,
and employees who are laid off in order to return the banks to
prosperity. This Part recommends abandonment of the “too big
to jail” model in favor of one imposing personal responsibility
on executives and creating a new single regulator.
280 Sarah N. Lynch, Deutsche Bank to Pay More than $40 million to Settle
Dark Pool Cases, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-deutsche-
bank-settlement-idUSKBN145245 [https://perma.cc/6N8N-ELC3].
281 That activity breached SEC “pay-to-play” rules, which prohibit the
payment of benefits by brokerage firms to state officials who can direct municipal
underwritings to the firm. Andrew Ackerman & Jessica Holzer, ‘Pay to Play’ Costs
Goldman, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390
443328404578022292515750144 [https://perma.cc/QM3K-6SZE].
282 Brian Wingfield & Dawn Kopecki, JPMorgan to Pay $410 Million in U.S. FERC
Settlement, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-30/
jpmorgan-to-pay-410-million-in-u-s-ferc-settlement [https://perma.cc/X69S-ZHGG].
283 Press Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, FERC Orders $453
Million in Penalties for Western Power Market Manipulation (July 16, 2013), https://
www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2013/2013-3/07-16-13.asp#.WGbVfLGZPUo [https://
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A. The System Is Broken
The failure to revoke the charters of larger banks is
generally blamed on a “too big to fail (or jail)” economic concern
(i.e., that putting large banks out of business could cause a
global economic crisis). That is a valid consideration, as
witnessed by the effects of the failure of Lehman Brothers in
2008 and the crisis that ensued. Nevertheless, such concerns do
not respond to widespread criticism of the fact that no senior
executives have been jailed in the wake of the Financial
Crisis.284 Despite the payout of hundreds of billions of dollars in
settlements by the banks they manage, no executives were
charged with a crime.
The lack of more indictments is surprising in light of the
billions of dollars paid by the large banks to settle regulators’
charges over RMBS abuses.285 If those abuses were actually of
such a magnitude, surely the banks should have been put out
of business. Moreover, the immensity of the fines would seem to
indicate that senior management would have necessarily been
involved or at least closed their eyes to the obvious, justifying
their prosecution. Instead, the banks kept their charters and
higher-level executives effectively gained immunity from civil
and criminal charges through the payment of large corporate
fines in settlements.286
The failure to prosecute executives at the too big to fail
banks has “reinforced the perception of a divided U.S. justice
system: One that treats the wealthy and influential with kid
gloves and a second that has imprisoned more average citizens
per capita than any other country on earth.”287 The New York
284 See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level
Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/
01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/TB87-VKRE].
285 Lynnley Browning, Too Big to Tax: Settlements Are Tax Write-offs for Banks,
NEWSWEEK (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/07/giant-penalties-are-
giant-tax-write-offs-wall-street-279993.html [https://perma.cc/J243-6Z27]. See generally
FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 81, at 391–408
(describing lending abuses).
286 A battle between editorial writers at the Wall Street Journal and the New
York Times occurred over the reasons for the failure to prosecute senior executives. On
the one hand, the Wall Street Journal editorial board asserted that there were no
prosecutions of senior executives because “they haven’t committed any crimes.” On
the other hand, a New York Times writer contends that, while there were crimes,
they were not prosecuted for “mysterious and confounding” reasons. See William D.
Cohan, The Whale That Should Not Have Gotten Away, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/business/dealbook/the-whale-that-should-not-
have-gotten-away.html?ref=dealbook [https://perma.cc/48TE-WZMK] (objecting to
the Journal’s position).
287 Rena Steinzor, White Collar Crime Reset is Long Overdue, 49 SEC. REG &
L. REP. (BNA) 160, 161 (Jan. 23, 2017).
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Times even claimed that the 2016 Presidential election’s
outcome might have been due to the failure of the Obama
administration to imprison any high ranking executives at the
large banks.288 Evidence of popular sentiment that a crackdown
on executives was needed was further demonstrated by a well-
attended conference on white-collar crime in 2016 where
speakers decried the lack of executive prosecutions. Bombastic
attacks at that conference included a claim by one speaker that
white-collar crime should be equated with rape.289
The criticism of the refusal to prosecute executives is
driven by an assumption of their guilt even though there were
no trials or even charges to determine culpability. Nevertheless,
such an assumption is not entirely without logic. Why would the
banks pay billions of dollars in settlements if massive fraud had
not occurred? And, if the fraud was that massive, then how could
it have been carried out without the knowledge of senior
executives? These are all logical questions and assumptions, but
there is more at play here than simple logic.
Financial crimes are complicated and difficult to prove.
Complex financial transactions are often involved in these
actions that look legitimate on their face and require financial
sophistication to understand their workings, which prosecutors
are wary of putting in front of a jury. Criminal intent on the part
of executives is also difficult to prove because they are removed
by several layers of management from the traders actually
engaging in the alleged wrongdoing.290 Indeed, as described
above, the government has had a notable lack of success in
contested cases brought against even relatively low-level traders
involved in the activities questioned by the government.
Even more difficult to prove would be cases brought
against senior executives, who are insulated by several layers of
management from the traders actually engaging in the
misconduct. If forced to fight, the large banks and their
executives could bring to bear massive resources to defend
themselves in court. Losses in such high-profile cases would be
288 Gretchen Morgenson, How Letting Bankers Off the Hook May Have
Tipped the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/
business/how-letting-bankers-off-the-hook-may-have-tipped-the-election.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/5VC8-LJJR].
289 Anita Raghavan, Law Enforcement ‘Not Winning’ War on White Collar Crime,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/07/business/dealbook/law-
enforcement-not-winning-war-on-white-collar-crime.html [https://perma.cc/PJ78-FS76].
290 Gregory Gilchrist, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime, 34 GA.
ST. L. REV. 335, 365 (2018) (“Simply put, the hierarchy and structure of corporations
mean that most corporate acts occur at levels many steps removed from central
management.”).
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harmful to the reputation of prosecutors; a government win
could put a large bank out of business, but with serious adverse
effects on shareholders, employees, and even the world economy.
Settlements imposing massive fines avoid those dangers
and provide global headlines that bolster the careers of
prosecutors and heighten the profile of their agencies. For
example, Eliot Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo rode publicity from
the cases they brought against the banks and other financial
institutions as attorneys general to gain the governorship of
New York.291 The fact that the SEC and CFTC assessed fines
totaling $12.3 billion between 2005 and 2011 adds to the
allegation that these fines are for publicity and not for effective
enforcement. These eye-popping numbers make them look
aggressive, but, notably, $4.5 billion of that amount was never
collected. Indeed, the CFTC collected only about 25 percent of
the fines it assessed in settlements.292 It seems that the deep
pockets of the large banks are responsible for much of the
settlement amounts that are actually collected.
The bank settlements have been further criticized for
containing various gimmicks that allow the banks to reduce
their payments. This includes provisions for “consumer relief”
that often involved restructuring the banks’ own bad loans.293
The settlement funds were also being used to fund state and
federal payouts that were outside the normal budget process.
In New York, settlement funds received by the state from the
large bank settlements were used, among other things, to build
horse stables for the state fair with warm water washing
stations, and to construct a concert stage and to provide rural
Internet access.294 California was using settlement funds to
shore up its underfunded state pension funds.295
Settlements obtained from the large banks have also
been used by prosecutors to create “slush funds” for donations
291 See FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 81,
at 703–04 (describing that background).
292 LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 54, at 276.
293 Matthew Goldstein, How ‘Consumer Relief’ After Mortgage Crisis Can
Enrich Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/17/
business/dealbook/mortgage-crisis-consumer-relief.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P4UX-
N6QZ]; Gretchen Morgenson, In a Mortgage-Crisis Settlement, Did a Bank Get off Easy?,
N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/business/credit-suisse-
mortgage.html [https://perma.cc/EMP7-ZHSE].
294 Christina Rexrode & Emily Glazer, Big Banks Paid $110 Billion in
Mortgage-Related Fines. Where Did the Money Go?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 9, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-paid-110-billionin-mortgage-related-fines-where-
did-the-money-go-1457557442 [https://perma.cc/M5G2-ZL7S] [hereinafter Where Did
the Money Go].
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to private non-profit, affordable housing advocates.296 Double
credit was given for such donations against the banks’ overall
settlement obligations.297 The DOJ also deposits 3 percent of its
settlement fines into an internal slush fund for uses unknown.298
In 2017, the Trump Administration began an investigation of
the DOJ slush funds and ordered that the practice of requiring
settlement payments to uninjured third parties be stopped.299
Apparently, the U.S. Attorney General did not like the allocation
of these funds to opposing political groups.
Why do the banks so readily accede to these settlement
demands? Senior executives at the large banks want to avoid
career-ending indictments, years of litigation, and
incarceration if charged and convicted. The large banks also
face the loss of their franchise—through the revocation of their
charters—if they are actually convicted of crimes, as was the
case for Arthur Andersen. A settlement avoids those problems.
The large banks, with a few exceptions, were also
allowed to settle the cases brought by regulators without
admitting or denying the government’s charges. Even for the few
exceptional settlements that required the banks to plead guilty
to charges, waivers were given from statutory disqualifications
that follow criminal convictions so that the banks could continue
their business as usual.300 Even admissions by the large banks in
these settlements may be couched in ambiguity. For example, in
the Wells Fargo settlement over the unauthorized creating of
customer accounts, the bank publicly took “full responsibility”
296 For example, in one settlement with the government by BofA and
Citigroup funds paid to community organizing groups was reported to have totaled $3
billion. John Aldan Byrne, Sessions Investigating ‘Slush Fund’ Used by Left-Wing
Groups, N.Y. POST (Aug. 5, 2017), http://nypost.com/2017/08/05/sessions-investigating-
slush-fund-used-by-left-wing-groups/ [https://perma.cc/7SNA-LHNE].
297 H.R. 5063, Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016, GOP.GOV, https://
www.gop.gov/bill/h-r-5063-stop-settlement-slush-funds-act-2016/ [https://perma.cc/66LS-
UYPJ]; Where Did the Money Go, supra note 294. The DOJ’s slush fund activities have
been criticized because it has the effect of a tax that is used for purposes not
appropriated by Congress. Legislation called the “Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act of
2016” has been introduced in Congress to forbid this practice. Bob Goodlatte, Stop
Settlement Slush Funds Act of 2016, VOTESMART (Sept. 7, 2016), https://votesmart.org/
public-statement/1130345/stop-settlement-slush-funds-act-of-2016#.WIerbLGZPeA [https://
perma.cc/R24F-D5YG].
298 Where Did the Money Go, supra note 294.
299 Tom Schoenberg, U.S. Ends Bank Penalty Practice Called ‘Slush Fund’ by
GOP, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-07/u-s-
ends-bank-penalty-practice-called-slush-fund-by-gop [https://perma.cc/BHJ5-79KZ]; Byrne,
supra note 296.
300 David Henry & Sarah N. Lynch, Update3-U.S. SEC Grants Waivers to Banks
After Guilty Pleas, REUTERS (May 20, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/banks-forex-
settlement-waivers-idUSL1N0YB1GA20150520 [https://perma.cc/2M29-44Z8]; see also Sean
Forbes, Banks Get Reason for Cheer Despite Naughty Affiliates, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 32 (Jan. 2, 2017).
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for the misconduct, but did not admit to the regulators’ charges
of fraud.301 Such arrangements seek to prevent the settlement
from being used as collateral estoppel by class action plaintiffs,
which often piggyback on government charges. The absence of
collateral estoppel allows the banks to more readily settle those
class actions.302
The massive bank settlements usually contain
provisions that allow the large banks to further temper their
effects. The settlements are generally structured in a manner that
allows much of the settlement amount to be treated as a deductible
business expense. This substantially reduces the actual out-of-
pocket costs of the settlements to the banks.303 Most of the post-
Financial Crisis mortgage settlements amounts also contained
provisions that required the banks to provide mortgage relief to
consumers, providing another tax deduction for the banks.304
In sum, these large settlements produce media
headlines, but are tempered by tax write-offs and are otherwise
treated as a business expense. In exchange, the banks preserve
their licenses and their executives are protected from
prosecution. The result is that these prosecutions serve neither
as a deterrent to future misconduct nor as punishment for
culpable acts.
B. The Functional Regulatory Model Is Not Functional
Financial services regulation in the United States is
conducted under a model called “functional” regulation. Under
301 Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Offers Regret, But Doesn’t Admit Misconduct,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/business/dealbook/wells-
fargo-apologizes-but-doesnt-admit-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/UH3W-TR94].
302 Even so, the large banks are paying out more billions of dollars to settle
such claims. For example, BofA agreed to a $2.43 billion settlement of class action
litigation over its disclosures concerning the acquisition of Merrill Lynch during the
Financial Crisis. The plaintiffs’ lawyers then sought $177 million in attorney fees and
costs from that settlement amount. BofA paid another $600 million to settle a class
action shareholder lawsuit brought by New York pension funds. Bank of America and
the Financial Crisis, supra note 104. In June 2011, BofA agreed to pay an additional
$8.5 billion to settle claims brought by investors over mortgage-backed securities.
Karen Freifeld, Court Approves Bank of America’s $8.5 Billion Mortgage Settlement,
REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bankofamerica-mbs-settle
ment-idUSBREA0U1FH20140131 [https://perma.cc/A243-AX7P]. A class action involving
claims of Libor manipulation was settled by Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, and HSBC Holdings
for $132 million in October 2017. Maria Armental, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC Agree
to $132 million Settlement in Libor Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/citigroup-deutsche-hsbc-agree-to-132-million-settlement-
in-libor-scandal-1507874502 [https://perma.cc/YV4F-J6QA].
303 Browning, supra note 285.
304 Deon Roberts, Bank of America Could Get Tax Break on Part of $16 Billion
Mortgage Settlement, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.charlotte
observer.com/news/business/banking/article9151250.html [https://perma.cc/NQ7U-8DWH].
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this model one regulator is supposed to be responsible for
regulating particular products in whatever market they are
sold.305 For example, the SEC is tasked with regulating the
offer and sale of securities, while the CFTC is assigned exclusive
regulation of trading in futures contracts. As seen from the
settlements announced in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis,
however, this model of functional regulation has broken down
completely. Multiple regulators at the federal level, and from the
states and their municipalities, and even foreign governments,
are regulating and massively fining the same conduct engaged
in by the same small number of large banks.
This functional regulatory model does not serve well in
a crisis. The Stock Market Crash of 1987 was a calamitous
event that multiple functional regulators were unable to
respond to or prevent.306 A Presidential Commission report on
that event recommended consolidation of financial services
regulation across markets for key regulatory requirements
such as the regulation of trading in volatile markets and
information systems.307 That recommendation was ignored.
Instead, a Presidential Working Group (PWG) on Financial
Market composed financial services regulators was created to
coordinate regulation.308 It proved to be ineffective during the
Financial Crisis of 2008 and served mostly to showcase the
squabbling of its members with each other over how to deal
with the crisis.309
Just prior to the Financial Crisis, the U.S. Department
of the Treasury (Treasury) issued a report critical of the costs
and effectiveness of functional regulation.310 That report
recommended the consolidation of financial services regulation
by, among other things, creating a single business conduct
regulator.311 As an interim step, the Treasury report urged the
305 Regulating the Moneychangers, supra note 2, at 848–63 (describing the
functional regulation model and its breakdown).
306 See generally Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock
Market Crash of 1987—The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1993 (1988) (describing that event).
307 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MKT. MECHANISMS, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ONMARKETMECHANISMS vi (1988).
308 See generally Exec. Order No. 12631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9421 (Mar. 18, 1988),
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12631.html
[https://perma.cc/G9YL-TVBD] (executive order creating this group).
309 See FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 81
at 745, 486; FROM ENRON ERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS, supra note 46, at
194 (describing some of those quarrels).
310 U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008).
311 Id. at 139–44.
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merger of the CFTC and SEC into a single agency.312 The
Financial Crisis of 2008 derailed the implementation of the
Treasury recommendation.
After the Financial Crisis, complaints were voiced by
the SEC and others that the “Balkanized” financial services
regulatory system had prevented effective regulation.313 Instead of
consolidated regulation, however, the Dodd-Frank Act only added
more layers of regulation. It created a Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC) on which sit numerous state and
federal financial services regulators. The FSOC is supposed to
regulate large financial institutions that pose a systemic risk to
the economy. In actuality, FSOC is only a more structured
PWG and is unlikely to prove effective in preventing or dealing
with future crises.314 Dodd-Frank also added another
redundant regulator, the CFPB.315 This additional layer of
regulation has only added more inefficiency and redundancy in
regulation. In addition to the CFPB, overlapping investigations
of the large banks are now being conducted at the federal level
by an alphabet soup of regulators, including DOJ, SEC, CFTC,
OCC, Fed, FDIC, Treasury, FinCEN, FHFA, NCUA, HUD,
FTC, FERC, OFAC, and DOL.
The issue of consolidated business conduct needs to be
revisited by both the Executive Branch and Congress.316 As the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted in 2016,
fragmentation and overlap in the regulation of financial
services “have created inefficiencies in regulatory processes,
inconsistencies in how regulators oversee similar types of
institutions, and differences in the levels of protection afforded
312 Id. at 106–11.
313 DIANA B. HENRIQUES, A FIRST-CLASS CATASTROPHE: THE ROAD TO BLACK
MONDAY, THEWORSTDAY INWALL STREETHISTORY 282 (2017).
314 See generally Jerry W. Markham, The Financial Stability Oversight
Council—Risk Manager or Debating Society, 33 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 3 (Dec. 2011)
(describing the likelihood that FSOC will be ineffective); see also Donald N. Lamson &
Hilary Allen, The Financial Stability Oversight Council: Completely New or Déjà Vu? BNA’S
BANKING REP. (May 24, 2011), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/files/newsinsights/
publications/2011/05/financial-stability-oversight-council-all-new-or__/files/view-full-article-
financial-stability-oversight-__/fileattachment/fia0526110financialstabilityoversightcouncil
alln__.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q65N-QVGT] (describing this body).
315 See, e.g., CFPB Takes Action Against Wells Fargo and JPMorgan Chase for
Illegal Mortgage Kickbacks, CFPB (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-wells-fargo-and-jpmorgan-chase-for-illegal-mortgage-
kickbacks/ [https://perma.cc/MKH2-AQHA].
316 Unfortunately, the Trump Administration’s Treasury Department is only
recommending that the CFTC and SEC harmonize their swap rules. The Treasury
rejected proposals to merge the two agencies and apparently did not even consider the
creation of a single regulator. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT
CREATES ECONOMICOPPORTUNITIES: CAPITALMARKETS 127, 178 (2017).
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to consumers.”317 Reform is needed to stop this wasteful
redundancy and the ongoing regulatory bank holdups. There
can be no justification for expending taxpayer funds to fund
investigations by multiple regulators of the same conduct by
the same small number of large banks. By the same token, the
banks should not be required to defend themselves against
hordes of regulators investigating the same alleged misconduct.
If reform of the existing regulatory model is to be effective,
regulation must be consolidated into a single regulator. That
single regulator would be tasked with regulating, investigating,
and sanctioning the abusive business conduct activities of
financial institutions.
To avoid further unnecessary regulatory overlap,
regulation at the state level also needs to be preempted. There
is no justification for forty-nine state attorneys general, and
other state connected institutions, including their pension
funds (plus the District of Columbia), to be pursuing the same
conduct by the same small number of banks. Indeed, as
described above, even local prosecutors are now queuing up for
handouts from the banks. Joint actions with foreign regulators
are subject to the same criticism.
There is precedent for consolidating and moving
regulatory jurisdiction from several regulators to a single
regulator. In 2000, England combined the regulation of
business conduct across all financial services into a single
regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The FSA
was much criticized for lax enforcement in the run up to the
Financial Crisis and was split into two regulatory bodies in the
wake of that event (i.e., the FCA and the Prudential Regulation
Authority).318 The FCA is responsible for policing abuses by all
317 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-175, FINANCIAL REGULATION:
COMPLEX AND FRAGMENTED STRUCTURE COULD BE STREAMLINED TO IMPROVE
EFFECTIVENESS (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675400.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XFT-
R7F8]. The SEC under the Trump Administration has signaled that it is pulling back
from its “broken windows” strategy of pursuing even minor violations. That agency has
not indicated whether it will continue its too big to jail approach, but enforcement
officials indicated that the agency would drop its nascent efforts to require admissions
of wrongdoing in its settlement agreements. Dave Michaels, SEC Signals Pullback From
Prosecutorial Approach to Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/sec-signals-pullback-from-prosecutorial-approach-to-enforcement-1509055200
[https://perma.cc/ZM28-M7N5]. The CFTC’s collection of fines in the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2017, totaled $413 million, down from $1.29 billion in the prior year. Gabriel
T. Rubin, CFTC Reports Steep Drop in Enforcement Actions and Fines, Wall St. J. (Nov.
22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-reports-steep-drop-in-enforcement-actions-
and-fines-1511384084 [https://perma.cc/Y7QB-33AQ]. These signals are hopeful, but
the next administration is free to resume the too big to jail model unless the structural
reforms recommended in this article are made.
318 FSA, http://www.fsa.gov.uk [https://perma.cc/V8Y3-92C4].
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financial institutions. That regulator has aggressively fulfilled
that role in recent years.319
Another example of consolidated regulation is the
CFPB, which assumed responsibility under the Dodd-Frank
Act for financial service regulations directed at protecting small
consumers of credit. “The CFPB was created to provide a single
point of accountability for enforcing federal consumer financial
laws and protecting consumers in the financial marketplace.
Before, that responsibility was divided among several agencies.”320
That consolidation should be extended across all financial
services, including the securities and commodity markets. To be
sure, there has been much criticism of the CFPB’s lack of
accountability.321 In order to address that very valid concern, the
new single regulator should be headed by a five-member
commission appointed by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate. This is the regulatory structure now
used at the CFTC and SEC and has proved to be workable and
could be readily adopted for a single regulator. The new single
regulator, however, should also be accountable to DOJ. This
will allow the single regulator and DOJ to coordinate decisions
on whether violations should be prosecuted civilly or
criminally, not both.
C. Restrictions Need to Be Imposed on the New Single
Regulator
More restrictions are needed to stop the practice of
imposing massive fines in exchange for preserving business
licenses and executive immunity. A much-overlooked fact is
that the costs associated with these monstrous payouts are
borne in the first instance by the banks’ innocent shareholders.
Those shareholders are the owners of the assets from which the
settlements are paid.322 Between 2008 and 2013, the litigation
319 See David N. Kirk, UK: Financial Conduct Authority Enforcement
Performance, MONDAQ (May 20, 2015), http://www.mondaq.com/x/398644/White+Collar+
Crime+Fraud/Financial+Conduct+Authority+Enforcement+Performance [https://perma.cc/
TPE7-W26P].
320 About Us, CFPB http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/
[https://perma.cc/44VA-2M9A].
321 See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proves Its
Critics Right, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.aei.org/publication/
consumer-financial-protection-bureau-proves-critics-right/ [https://perma.cc/9BLA-SYAW];
see also PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that
the CFPB regulatory structure was unconstitutional as an agency unsupervised by the
executive branch).
322 In 2006, the SEC established settlement guidelines that required the
agency to consider the effects of corporate penalties on shareholders, but that policy
was abandoned in the wake of the Financial Crisis. Rob Tricchinelli, High-Dollar
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expenses of the six largest banks reached a level of $51 million
per day, which was “more than all dividends paid to
shareholders in the past five years” and enough to swallow all
earnings by those banks in 2012.323 One $13 billion settlement
by JPMorgan was equal to over 60 percent of its profits in the
prior year.324 Almost all of Barclays’ profits over a five-year
period were eliminated as the result of fines and settlements.325
The $7.2 billion dollar settlement by Deutsche Bank at the end
of 2016326 resulted in its reporting a $2 billion fourth quarter
loss to shareholders.327
The employees of large banks are another group of
innocents affected adversely by these massive settlements. In
2011, tens of thousands of employees at the large banks were
laid-off in the wake of the Financial Crisis to compensate for
revenue losses associated with regulatory actions. Wall Street
firms eliminated more than 75,000 jobs. For example, in that
year, BofA cut 30,000 positions, Citigroup eliminated 5,000
jobs, and Morgan Stanley laid off 4,000 employees.328 The
layoffs continued in the following years. The four largest banks
eliminated almost 30,000 jobs in 2012. JPMorgan laid off
17,000 employees in 2013.329 Goldman Sachs announced in
2016 that it was cutting 1,700 staff positions, bringing the
overall reduction of the Goldman Sachs workforce to 10,000
employees in the years following the Financial Crisis.330 BofA
Enforcement Cases From SEC Could Dip Under New Leaders, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 14 (Jan. 2, 2017). Legislation has been introduced in Congress to require SEC
economists to consider the effects of settlements on corporation shareholders. Id.
323 Donal Griffin & Dakin Campbell, U.S. Bank Legal Bills Exceed $100
Billion, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 28, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-
08-28/u-s-bank-legal-bills-exceed-100-billion [https://perma.cc/WL5Z-97NZ].
324 Nick Summers, JPMorgan’s $13 Billion Settlement: Jamie Dimon is a
Colossus No More, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 28, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2013-10-24/jpmorgans-13-billion-settlement-jamie-dimon-is-a-colossus-no-more
[https://perma.cc/W4B7-SQ7K].
325 Zeke Faux & Hugh Son, Why Barclays CEO Staley Opted for War When
Dimon Chose Surrender, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 17 (Jan. 2, 2017).
326 See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text (describing that settlement).
327 Silvia Amaro, Deutsche Bank Posts $2 Billion Loss in Fourth Quarter as
Litigation Costs Weigh, CNBC, (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/02/deutsche-
banks-full-year-net-loss-narrows-to-146-billion-in-2016-versus-73-billion-in-2015.html
[https://perma.cc/YN67-GXT9].
328 Maureen Farrell,Wall Street Prepares for More Layoffs, CNNMONEY (Aug. 15,
2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/08/15/investing/wall-street-layoffs/ [https://perma.cc/
WSS7-SR6Z].
329 Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Pulls Belt Tight—Biggest U.S. Bank by Assets
Plans to Cut 17,000 Jobs As Trend Accelerates, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324338604578327983190210680 [https://
perma.cc/282M-GNGD].
330 Stephen Gandel, Goldman Sachs Announces Its Biggest Layoffs Since
Financial Crisis, FORTUNE (July 19, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/19/goldman-sachs-
layoffs-3/ [https://perma.cc/2C3V-YKYK].
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also announced in 2016 that it was planning to cut another
8,000 jobs.331 Deutsche Bank announced shortly after its $7.2
billion mortgage settlement in December 2016 that it was
laying off several hundred employees.332
Despite the effect on shareholders and employees, the
new single regulator will very likely be tempted to boost its
image through the imposition of massive fines against the
banks. That temptation should be removed. Responsibility for
wrongdoing should be shifted from the shareholders and
employees to individual managers. Therefore, restrictions on
that regulator’s ability to fine financial institutions are needed.
Financial institutions should be spared from large regulatory
fines, unless it is shown through an actual trial that
widespread misconduct was authorized and conducted with the
knowledge of top-level management. That is, there should be
no fines on corporations unless senior executives have been
prosecuted and found guilty of a crime in connection with their
management responsibilities. Even then, corporate fines should
be limited to a few million dollars, which should be sufficient to
signal to the board of directors that increased oversight is
needed, while preserving the assets of innocent shareholders.
This limitation would also reflect the reality that large fines
paid in settlements do not deter financial misconduct.
Restrictions on a single regulator are also needed to
assure fairness in its civil actions that seek imposition of quasi-
criminal penalties, such as fines and business bars. Among
other things, the burden of proof should be increased. This will
assure protection from assessing criminal-like sanctions using
the comparatively low standard of proof in civil actions brought
by the SEC and CFTC. The present preponderance of the
evidence standard used in those civil proceedings should be
increased to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in
criminal cases. At the very least, a clear and convincing
evidence test should be applied, rather than the existing “more
likely than not” tests.333 This higher standard would reflect that
331 Mike Snider, Bank of America Plans More Job Cuts, USA TODAY (June 15,
2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/06/15/report-bank-america-plans-
more-job-cuts/85918494/ [https://perma.cc/WAF4-WLKY].
332 Jenny Strasburg, Deustche Bank Set to Slash Equities, Fixed-Income Jobs;
CEO John Cryan Has Said Around 9,000 Employees To Go In Broad Cost-Cutting
Drive, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/deutsche-bank-set-to-
slash-equities-fixed-income-jobs-1486122004 [https://perma.cc/5MHN-2RAM].
333 See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the U.S. Treasury Market, 100 MARQ.
L. REV. 185, 226 (2016) (discussing the preponderance of the evidence standard versus
the clear and convincing standard in establishing violations) [hereinafter Regulating
the U.S. Treasury Market].
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disciplinary actions brought by financial services regulators are
fraud based and punitive in nature. Such actions typically
require higher standards of proof and intent than non-fraud
and non-punitive actions.334
Additional restrictions on the single regulator are
needed to prevent it from continuing existing regulatory
abuses. A much-criticized practice at the SEC is the use of its
internal administrative courts to sanction violations. Those
proceedings are objectionable because the administrative law
judges presiding over those proceedings work for the SEC and
there is no jury trial available. The SEC is thus judge, jury,
and prosecutor in these one-sided actions.335 The single
regulator should be restricted from using such administrative
proceedings to adjudicate violations.336
Still another area of concern for the creation of a single
regulator are the costs associated with the adoption of business
conduct rules for the financial institutions that it will regulate.
There has been much criticism, and more than a few court
cases finding, that such rules are being adopted by the SEC
and other agencies without regard to the costs they impose.337
To avoid that concern, the single regulator should be required
to conduct rigorous economic cost/benefit analyses before
adopting any rules.338
CONCLUSION
It is time to end the “too big to jail” regulatory model in
which large banks pay hundreds of billions of dollars to settle
multiple charges brought in relation to the same conduct by a
334 For example, in Aaron v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), the
Supreme Court held that the SEC was required to prove scienter, and not mere
negligence, in regulatory actions brought under its most broadly applied antifraud rule
(17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5). More recently, the Supreme Court held in Kokesh v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), that SEC disgorgement remedies—a requirement that a
defendant return ill-gotten gains—while remedial in nature, nevertheless acted as a
“penalty” and was subject to the federal five-year statute of limitations for government
actions seeking penalties (28 U.S.C. § 2462).
335 Regulating the U.S. Treasury Market, supra note 333, at 225–27 (proposing
restrictions on internal administrative proceedings brought by a consolidated regulator).
336 The circuit courts are now split over the issue of whether agency ALJs
should have the power to punish violators in administrative proceedings. See Rob
Tricchinelli, D.C. Cir. Deadlocks on Challenges to SEC Judges, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1058 (July 3, 2017) (describing these decisions).
337 See generally Rachel Benedict, Judicial Review of SEC Rules: Managing
the Costs of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 97 MINN. L. REV. 278 (2012) (article criticizing cases
setting aside SEC rules on cost-benefit grounds).
338 See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L. J. 882 (2015) (article discussing debates over
cost benefit analysis).
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host of state, federal, and even foreign regulators. The
regulatory model applied in the post-Financial Crisis cases is
neither effective nor appropriate. There is very little support by
anyone for the reasoning behind this regulatory approach. As
described above, many critics are concerned that the banks are
charged with widespread fraud but are allowed to continue
business as usual and no senior executives are jailed. Other
critics charge that the settlements are simply a form of official
larceny that the banks must accede to in order to retain their
charters and that the settlements only hurt innocent
shareholders and employees.
Regulation of financial services should be consolidated
into a single federal regulator, and state regulation should be
preempted. This would stop the multiple, duplicative
regulatory actions that are now common for the large banks.
This single regulator should also be restricted in its ability to
levy large fines, even in a settlement, in the absence of
demonstrated culpability at the executive level. These changes
should remove the incentives continuation of the too big to jail
regulatory model and focus the attention of regulators on those
actually responsible for misconduct.
